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Appendix 1
Table 2.1. GDP Composition by Sector (2014) 
  France Germany Netherlands Poland Romania
Agriculture 1,7% 0,9% 2,8% 3,7% 12,4%
Industry 19,4% 30,8% 22,3% 32,0% 35,6%
Services 78,9% 68,4% 74,8% 64,3% 52,0%
Source: Central Intelligence Agency 
2. Financial Overview
2.1 Overview
This section provides background information. First, we 
provide macro-economic information on the Research 
Countries (Section 2.2), such as GDP growth rates, expec-
tation of growth, the largest economic sectors, etc. This 
section is followed by SME-specific information within 
the Research Countries, such as characteristics, contribu-
tion, financing structure and access to financing. Further, 
we look more specifically at the innovation trends in the 
Research Countries and those of SMEs. This chapter then 
provides a conclusion.
2.2 Macroeconomic Environment
According to the Dutch Central Bank’s report SME Financ-
ing in the Euro Area (2014), SMEs in the EU market rep-
resent more than 99.9% of all European firms. In addition, 
they generate over 58% of gross added value. SMEs also play 
a crucial role in employment. In 2014, the EU SME sector 
accounted for 67% of all corporate sector employment.1
From 2010 to 2013, France’s GDP growth declined from 
2% to 0.29%. In terms of purchasing power parity, GDP 
per capita was then – and is currently – one of the lowest 
among Western European countries. France’s unemploy-
ment rate increased between 2008 and 2013, reaching 
10.4%. This level of unemployment was marginally lower 
than the average EU unemployment in 2013.2 (Appendix 
3, Table A1).
Table 2.1 shows that France’s largest economic sector is 
services, accounting for 78.9% of GDP. France’s current 
account balance is negative (as are Romania’s and Po-
land’s): in 2013, this figure was -1.43% of GDP. In that 
year, trade in France generated over 58% of GDP. How-
ever, this share had been marginally declining since 2011 
(Appendix 3, Table A1).
Similar to France, Germany’s GDP growth rate consis-
tently declined, from 4.09% in 2010 to 0.11% in 2013. In 
1 Deutsche Bank Report: SME Financing in the Euro Area (2014). Last viewed: May 9,, 2019.
2 European Commission Unemployment Statistics for 2013 [link] Last viewed: May 9 , 2019. 
3 Appendix 3, Table A2.
4 Netherlands Statistics, last viewed May 9, 2019 [link].
5 European Commission GDP per capita, consumption per capita and price level indices for 2013 [link]. Last viewed: May 9, 2019.
terms of purchasing power parity, Germany’s GDP per 
capita is among the highest in the EU area.3 Higher GDP 
per capita implies that households have more disposable 
income, which then drives demand for SMEs’ products 
and services. Germany’s unemployment rate dropped 
from 7.7% in 2010 to slightly over 5% in 2013. Among the 
five countries in our sample, only Germany’s unemploy-
ment rate has declined in the last few years (Appendix 3, 
Table A2).
As in France, Germany’s largest economic sector is ser-
vices, which makes up to 68.4% of GDP (Table 2.1). The 
country’s current account balance is among the highest in 
the EU. In 2010, Germany had over 70% of GDP created 
by trade, while in 2013, the share was over 85% (Appendix 
3, Table A2).
Unlike Germany’s or France’s, the Dutch economy con-
tracted in 2012 and 2013, having had a negative GDP 
growth rate. In 2011, the GDP growth rate was 1.66%, 
while in 2013, it was -0.73%. This trend has recovered 
since the first quarter of 2014.4 Among the five countries 
in our study, the Netherlands has the highest GDP per 
capita and is in the top 5% within the EU. However, its 
unemployment rate almost doubled from 2009 to 2013, 
reaching 6.7% (Appendix 3, Table A2).
The largest sector in Netherlands is services. This sector 
made up 74.8% of GDP in 2013. Starting in 2008, the ac-
count balance doubled in five years, reaching over 10.2% 
of GDP in 2013. Trade in the Netherlands generated over 
155% of GDP in 2013. Over the past few years, there has 
been a steady increase of trade in GDP. This implies that 
the sum of exports and imports are greater than the value 
of GDP (Appendix 3, Table A3).
Poland has a positive GDP growth rate, but the growth 
speed declined over time. In 2011, Poland’s growth rate 
over the previous five years was the highest (4.8%), while 
in 2013, its growth was 1.67%. Among the five EU coun-
tries in our study, Poland has a lower than average GDP 
per capita (EUR 24,000 in 2013).5 
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Small < 50 ≤ €10 million ≤ €10 million
Medium-sized < 250 ≤ €50 million ≤ €43 million
Source: EC
Table 2.3. Total number of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
France 2 329 961 2 188 690 2 509 347 2 562 952 2 614 121 2 598 023 2 569 972
Germany 1 866 817 2 018 855 2 053 601 2 137 578 2 184 908 2 201 144 2 254 315
Netherlands 576 286 616 241 776 315 802 377  813 316 802 087 797 978
Poland 1 531 059 1 421 561 1 457 207 1 499 812 1 494 494 1 474 953 1 464 234
Romania 504 581 489 646 442 241 404 338 410 210 426 295 433 858
Source: SBA Fact Sheet 
Similar to the other countries in the study (with the 
exception of Germany), Poland’s unemployment rate con-
stantly increased, having reached more than 10% in 2013 
(Appendix 3, Table A4).
Table 2.1 shows that Poland’s largest economic sector 
is services, accounting for 64.3% of the country’s GDP. Po-
land’s current account is negative but rose from -5.04% in 
2010 to -1.35% in 2013. At the same time, trade generates 
over 90% of GDP. The role of trade in the Polish economy 
is increasing, and its respective share grew by 12% from 
2009 to 2013 (Annex Table A.4).
In 2013, Romania’s GDP growth rate was 3.5%, making 
it the leader in growth among the five countries in this 
report. The growth rate trend is volatile, however; in 2012, 
growth was small, at 0.35%, but jumped in 2013 to an 
impressive 3.5%. Among the five countries in our study, 
Romania has the lowest GDP per capita (EUR 7.15). 
The GDP per capita is also lower than the EU average. 
Romania’s unemployment rate has recently been relatively 
stable, remaining at around 7% (Annex Table A.5).
As in all other Research Countries, Romania’s largest 
economic sector is services, with a contribution of 52% 
of GDP. Romania’s account balance improved from -4% 
in 2008 to -1% of GDP in 2013. Over the past three years, 
the role of trade in the Romanian economy has been rela-
tively stable, at around 85% of GDP (Annex Table A.5).
2.3 Small-Medium Enterprises
2.3.1. Characteristics
According to the European Commission’s definition, an 
enterprise is defined as micro if it employees fewer than 
ten people and either its annual turnover or its annual 
balance sheet is less than EUR 2 mil. Small enterprises are 
defined as companies with ten to 49 employees and hav-
ing an annual turnover and balance sheet between EUR 2 
and 10 mil. Medium-sized enterprises have fewer than 250 
employees; their annual turnover is less than EUR 50 mil; 
and their balance sheets are less than EUR 43 mil.
According to European Commission data, in 2014, there 
were 2,569,972 SMEs in France, 2,254,315 in Germany, 
797,978 in the Netherlands, 1,464,234 in Poland and 
433,858 in Romania. Between 2008 and 2014, France had 
a 12.2% increase in the number of SMEs up to the year 
2012, and a small decrease afterward. In Germany, there 
was stable growth in the number of SMEs over the same 
seven years, with an average annual growth rate of 3.19%. 
The Netherlands had the same growth pattern as France, 
with a spike in 2012 and a subsequent decrease. Poland 
had a huge negative shock in 2008–2009, with a 7.15% de-
crease in the number of SMEs. Thereafter, it had a positive 
growth from 2009–2011 and for the following years until 
2014, when it again started to suffer from a slow decrease.
The construction, trade and technical sectors represent 
the largest shares of SMEs in France (19.05%, 26.29% 
and 15.85%, respectively). Manufacturing is also one 
of the common industries among small (20.35%) and 
medium-sized (33.2%) enterprises. The electricity, gas, 
steam and air conditioning supply industry shows out-
standing growth in the number of SMEs from 2008 to 
2014 (368.36%), whereas SMEs in mining and quarrying 
decreased by 11.52% in the same period.
The largest share of SMEs in Germany is represented by 
the wholesale/retail trade and technical sectors (27.41% 
and 17.81%, respectively). Manufacturing is also one of 
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the common industries among small (17.52%) and medi-
um-sized (26.27%) enterprises. In comparison with other 
countries in this study, the real estate industry seems very 
unusual: there is a significant domination of micro en-
terprises over those classified as small and medium-sized 
(10.6% as compared to 1.08% and 1%, respectively). 
Trade and accommodation/food services show the biggest 
growth in number of SMEs from 2008 to 2014 (36.7% and 
31.99%, respectively).
The construction, wholesale/retail trade and technical 
sectors account for the biggest shares of SMEs in the 
Netherlands (15.8%, 24.65% and 26.85%, respectively). 
Manufacturing is also one of the common industries among 
small (13.59%) and medium-sized (22%) enterprises. The 
information and communications industry shows the big-
gest growth (100.82%) in the number of SMEs between 2008 
and 2014. The largest share of SMEs in Poland is represented 
by the manufacturing, construction, wholesale/retail trade 
and technical sectors (11.85%, 14.89%, 34.11% and 14.42%, 
respectively). Manufacturing is also one of the common 
industries among small (28.09%) and medium-sized 
(40.94%) enterprises. In comparison with other countries 
in this study, the transportation and storage industry seems 
very unusual: there is a substantial domination of micro 
enterprises over those classified as small and medium-sized 
(9.93% as compared to 5.71% and 5.48%). The electricity, 
gas, steam and air conditioning supply industry shows the 
most significant growth in the number of SMEs from 2008 
to 2014 (62.36%), whereas accommodation/food services 
decreased by 24.5% during the same period.
The manufacturing, wholesale/retail trade and scientific/
technical sectors account for the biggest share of SMEs in 
Romania (12.02%, 39.03% and 12.96%, respectively). The 
electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply industry 
shows the biggest growth in the number of SMEs from 
2008 to 2014 (159.87%), whereas the construction indus-
try shows a 27.86% decrease for the same period.
2.3.2. Contribution
According to the Dutch Bank’s report on SME financing 
in the Euro area (2014), SMEs will significantly contrib-
ute to the recovery of the EU economy after the crisis. 
The authors argue that SMEs contribute to the decrease 
in unemployment and spur job creation, investments in 
innovation and development.
In France, SMEs represent 99.81% of the total number of 
firms; employ 62.82% of the total work force; and contrib-
ute 58.52% of the total added value of selected industries 
in the French economy (see Annex, Table B1). The biggest 
growth among SMEs was in the number of small enter-
prises (2.16%).
In Germany, SMEs represent 99.53% of the total number 
of firms; employ 63% of the total work force; and contrib-
ute 54.88% of the total added value of selected industries 
in the German economy (see Annex, Table B2). The 
biggest growth among SMEs was in the number of small 
enterprises (4.42%). The contribution of SMEs to Germa-
ny was an increase in employment from 60.38% to 63% 
over the period 2008–2014.
In the Netherlands, SMEs represent 99.83% of the total 
number of firms; employ 67.51% of the total work force; 
and contribute 61.92% of the total added value of selected 
industries in the Dutch economy (see Appendix 3, Table 
B3). The biggest growth among SMEs was seen in micro 
enterprises (6.21%), while small enterprises had a negative 
growth rate (-2.12%). The contribution of SMEs to Dutch 
employment was an increase from 65.36% to 67.51% over 
the period 2008–2014.
In Poland, SMEs represent 99.8% of the total number of 
firms; employ 69% of the total work force; and contrib-
ute 50.17% of the total added value of selected industries 
in the Polish economy (see Annex, Table B4). The only 
growing segment among SMEs was small enterprises 
(0.28%), while micro and medium-sized enterprises had a 
negative growth rate (-0.77% and -1.11%, respectively).
In Romania, SMEs represent 99.68% of the total number of 
firms; employ 67.23% of the total work force; and contrib-
ute 49.94% of the total added value of selected industries 
in the Romanian economy (see Appendix 3, Table B5). The 
only growing segment among SMEs was small enterprises 
(0.26%), while micro and medium-sized enterprises had a 
negative growth rate (-2.75% and -3.88%, respectively). The 
contribution of SMEs to Romanian employment was an in-
crease from 65.82% to 67.23% over the 2008–2014 period.
2.3.3. Financing structure
Table 2.4 shows that debt instruments (such as bank loans, 
overdrafts and leasing/hire-purchases) are more relevant 
than equity for the Euro area SMEs. The most relevant 
instrument is the bank loan.
Table 2.4. Financing structure of Euro area SMEs (2014)
Financing instrument Relevant Not applicable to the firm Do not know
Bank loan 61,50% 37,49% 1,01%
Bank overdraft 52,77% 46,17% 1,06%
Leasing or hire-purchase 45,36% 53,51% 1,13%
Subsidised loan 34,92% 63,30% 1,78%
Equity 15,49% 82,26% 2,25%
Source: ECB SAFE report 
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2.5 Conclusion
The analysis in this section leads to the conclusion that 
SMEs in the Research Countries are important drivers 
of economic growth and add significant value to their 
respective economies. External shocks (economic crises 
or changes in regulations) negatively affect the SME 
sector by constraining their access to short- and long-
term financing. As the previous literature shows, the most 
important factor in the performance of the SME sector 
is access to financing. Therefore, we need to analyze and 
understand the capital markets of the Research Countries 
in more detail (Appendix 2).
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Appendix 2
Table 3.1. Total number of commercial banks by country
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
France 310 302 290 281 278 280
Germany 273 278 280 284 273 277
Netherlands 302 295 290 287 260 253
Poland  71  70  70  67  69  69
Romania  31  30  31  31  30  29
Source: IMF Financial Access Survey (FAS)
3. Capital Markets
3.1 Overview
From 2008 to 2013, the number of credit institutions in 
France gradually declined. In 2008, there were 22 banking 
group, and in 2013, there were 18. A declining number of 
credit institutions is a characteristic of most subgroups, 
with the exception of domestic credit institutions, which 
have recently been recovering to 2008 levels (16) (Appen-
dix 3, Table C1). 
The number of credit institutions in Germany has been 
steadily declining. For example, in 2008, there were 50 
banking groups in Germany, and in 2013, there were 35. 
Similarly, as in the case of France, the declining number of 
credit institutions is characteristic of all credit institution 
subgroups (banking groups, stand-alone credit institu-
tions, and domestic and foreign-controlled credit branch-
es) (Appendix 3, Table C2). 
The number of credit institutions in the Netherlands is sta-
ble. For example, in 2008, there were four banking groups 
in the Netherlands, and in 2013, there were five. All other 
classes of credit institutions show very little fluctuation 
(stand-alone credit institutions, domestic or foreign con-
trolled subsidiaries and branches) (Appendix 3, Table C3).
Similarly to Poland, for period between 2008 and 2013, 
the number of credit institutions was been stable. In 2008, 
there were 645 stand-alone credit institutions, and in 
2013, there were 634 (Appendix 3, Table C4).
The number of credit institutions in Romania is stable, as 
in the Netherlands and Poland. Nevertheless, the bank-
ing sector is still underdeveloped relative to that of other 
countries in this study. For example, in 2008 there were 
only 32 stand-alone credit institutions (Poland had 645), 
and in 2013, there were 27. All other classes of credit 
institutions show very little fluctuation (banking groups, 
domestic or foreign controlled subsidiaries and branches) 
(Appendix 3, Table C5).
3.2 Debt Capital Markets
3.2.1. Banking Sector
France has 18 credit institutions, all of which are bank-
ing groups. The total assets of all credit institutions are 
EUR 6.2 tn, 5.5% of which belong to foreign subsidiaries/
branches. France has the highest concentration of large en-
terprises among banks by asset value; close to 98% of total 
banking assets belong to large corporations. The average 
return on equity in the French banking industry reached 
6% in 2013, an increase of nearly 1.5% over 2009 levels. 
Likewise, overall return on assets increased from 0.23% 
to 0.33%, while the total share of equity in total assets has 
increased. The total share of loans and advances accounts 
for 57.2% of the balance sheet (300% of GDP), while total 
deposits are around 50% (Appendix 3, Table C1).
The share of non-performing loans in France is relatively 
higher than in Germany. In addition, it increased from 
3.11% in 2008 to 4.64% in 2013. Every successful banking 
sector is supported by the successful enforcement of prob-
lem loan resolution. The funding of balance sheets is equally 
distributed between deposits and other resources. In 2013, 
the share of deposits in total bank assets was 50%. As in the 
case of Germany, this share has increased over the past few 
years, though at a slower rate (Appendix 3, Table C1).
As a leading banking country, Germany has 1682 credit 
institutions, 35 of which are banking groups and 76 of 
which are foreign-controlled subsidiaries and branches. 
Total assets of all operating credit institutions amount to 
EUR 6.7 tn, or 240% of GDP. Germany has the biggest 
deposit base in nominal values among the countries in 
the study, at almost EUR 4 tn, but it decreased by 16% 
over the period 2009–2013. From 2008 to 2013, banking 
sector performance improved, and its profitability has 
been stable at around a 0.6% return on assets since 2010. 
Return on equity followed a similar trend, recovering in 
2009 from a negative to a positive 1.88%, and to 1.26% in 
2013. The share of non-performing loans is relatively low 
and stable, ranging from 1.89% in 2008 to 1.81% in 2013, 
with a slight increase in 2011 (Appendix 3, Table C2).
German banks’ balance sheets are funded mainly by 
deposits. Currently, deposits make up 59% of total bank 
assets, an increase from 48% in 2013. This significant in-
crease in deposits feeds the drop in spending by German 
consumers (Appendix 3, Table C2).
The Dutch banking sector includes 91 organizations, five 
of which are banking groups and 62 of which are for-
eign-controlled subsidiaries and branches. Total assets of 
all domestic credit institutions equal 350% of GDP; 28% 
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of this is foreign-owned, which, in sum, is the biggest 
value among the Research Countries. Total loans and 
advances make up 73.7% of total assets (as in the case of 
Poland), this being the highest share among the Research 
Countries. From 2008 to 2013, banking sector perfor-
mance improved from a -0.37% return on assets in 2008 
to 0.24% in 2013. Return on equity followed a similar 
trend, jumping from -12.12% in 2008 to 5.0% in 2013 
(Appendix 3, Table C3).
Of the five countries in this study, the share of non-per-
forming loans is the lowest in the Netherlands, ranging 
from 1.87% in 2008 to 2.73% in 2013. The funding of 
balance sheets is equally distributed among deposits and 
other resources. In 2013, the share of deposits in total 
bank assets was close to 57%. As in the case of France, the 
share has increased over the past four years, though at a 
slower rate (Appendix 3, Table C3).
Poland has 637 credit institutions, but only 583 of them are 
domestic. A very common feature of Poland and Roma-
nia is that foreign credit institutions or their subsidiaries/
branches dominate on the market in terms of asset value.6 
In 2008, total assets of all credit institutions were over EUR 
254 bil, while in 2013, total assets increased to EUR 343 bil 
(Appendix 3, Table C4). From 2008 to 2013, the sector per-
formance was relatively stable, with a slight decline in re-
turn on assets from 1.32% in 2008 to 1.12% in 2013. Return 
on equity followed a similar trend, dropping from 14.14% in 
2008 to 9.97% in 2013. The share of non-performing loans 
recently improved and currently stands at 5.9%. Distribu-
tion of balance sheets has been relatively stable over the past 
five years. In 2013, the share of deposits in total bank assets 
was close to 68.25% (Appendix 3, Table C4).
The Romanian banking sector has 37 credit institutions, 
ten of which are banking groups. Thirty-one credit insti-
tutions are foreign and dominate the market in terms of 
assets (50.76% of GDP as compared to 5.62% by domestic 
ones). Romanian banks have the biggest deposit base 
among the countries studied (84.12% of total assets). 
In 2008, total assets of all credit institutions amounted 
to over EUR 81 bil, remaining at the same level in 2013 
(Appendix 3, Table C5).
From 2008 to 2013, the banking sector’s performance 
gradually worsened, with a drop in return on assets from 
1.72% in 2008 to 0.08% in 2013. The return on equity 
followed a similar trend, dropping from 18.9% in 2008 to 
0.01% in 2013, after a negative return in 2012. The share 
of non-performing loans dramatically increased, from 
1.47% in 2008 to 17.87% in 2013. In 2013, the share of de-
posits in total bank assets was close to 84.12%, and there 
were no major fluctuations between 2008 and 2013. 
France, Germany and the Netherlands have close to the 
same number of licensed banks – fewer than 300 – where-
as Poland has 69 licensed banks and Romania only 29. 
The number of banks decreased over 2009–2013, from 
6 Thomas White International: Emerging Markets Spotlight [link] Last viewed: May, 9, 2019. 
7 Oliver Wyman (2014). Last viewed:, `May 9, 2019. [link]
8 Grover and Souminen (2014); OECD (2013). The figure above clearly shows that in the countries in our study, the equity supply in 2012 dropped 
relative to that of 2007.
310 to 280 in France and from 302 to 253 in the Neth-
erlands. Total assets in the banking sector dramatically 
declined in France, Germany and the Netherlands (espe-
cially in Germany), increased in Poland, and remained 
constant in Romania. Banking sector performance im-
proved in France, Germany and the Netherlands, while it 
decreased in Poland and Romania. The share of non-per-
forming loans worsened in France and Romania but 
stayed constant in Germany, the Netherlands and Poland. 
Bank financing by deposits increased in Germany and the 
Netherlands, while staying unchanged in France, Poland 
and Romania. The banking sector in Romania and Poland 
is dominated by foreign banking groups, which might be 
more risk-averse towards local market risks and, there-
fore, impose higher interest rates, especially for SMEs. 
3.3.2. Non-Banking Sector
Guarantees
France is the leading country in terms of the absolute 
amount of outstanding guarantees, while Romania has the 
highest ratio of guarantees to GDP. The Netherlands, Po-
land and Romania have relatively the same level of issued 
guarantees (around EUR 2 bil), while Germany has three 
times more, but they constitute the smallest percentage of 
GDP (0.2%).
Securitization
According to Figure[ 3.2, the overall securitization trend 
shows the decline over last seven years. After the crisis, se-
curitization issuance significantly dropped – especially in 
Germany, where it dropped from USD 151 bil in 2008 to 
USD 25 bil the following year. The Netherlands is one of 
the leading countries in this (after the UK), with USD 340 
bil of outstanding securitization, but the peak was in 2010, 
when it had USD 433 bil; thus, we see a negative trend 
that began that year, with new issuances decreasing in the 
following years, dropping even below (post-) crisis levels. 
On the other hand, in France, we see the opposite situ-
ation: in the post-crisis period, its outstanding amounts 
gradually increased, and rapidly so in 2014.
3.3 Equity Capital Markets
According to the study “Towards Better Capital Markets 
Solution for SME Financing” (2014), the most effective 
alternative to the traditional SME bank financing is equity 
financing. The platforms where SME’s shares are listed 
carry lower information requirements and have lower 
fixed listing costs. For the time being, only medium-sized 
firms are fit for this type of financing.7
However, besides the recognized demand for alternative 
sources of financing on the one hand, and the increased 
demand for financing on the other, the Research Coun-
tries’ markets have experienced a significant drop in the 
supply of venture capital in recent years (Figure 3.3).8 
Figure 3.1. Total volume of outstanding guarantees by 
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Figure 3.4. Trends in Venture Capital Investments 2007-2012
Source: Grover and Souminen, 2014.
Figure 3.5. Private equity investments in Europe by sector, EUR bil
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Table 3.2. Total Private equity investments by size of the portfolio company, EUR mil
# of employees 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0 - 19 1 788,68 1 271,34 1 761,96 1 545,01 1 753,25 1 473,34
20 - 99 5 038,68 4 225,05 4 717,14 4 426,17 4 039,39 3 874,64
100 - 199 4 594,98 1 925,23 2 702,78 4 568,37 3 516,63 3 356,81
200 - 249 1 634,37 673,06 1 759,62 1 541,51 1 430,95 1 066,24
250 - 499 4 232,78 2 074,48 4 014,85 4 684,69 4 489,48 4 095,15
500 - 999 6 519,74 3 699,92 3 976,37 7 422,04 6 046,67 6 056,95
1,000 - 4,999 17 969,22 7 167,48 15 220,34 12 279,57 10 687,99 11 674,89
5,000 + 11 587,28 3 271,85 7 765,42 8 402,79 4 787,93 4 128,19
Total 53 365,73 24 308,41 41 918,47 44 870,15 36 752,29 35 726,21
Source: EVCA 
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Table 3.3. Number of private equity firms (by type) headquartered in the following countries (2013)





Total number of  
private equity firms
France 71 87 112 270
Germany 136 75 49 260
Netherlands 45 42 38 125
Poland 17 13 4 34
Romania 1 1 1 3
Average Europe 32 26 19 77
Total Europe 793 651 473 1 917
Source: EVCA
Table 3.4. Capital under management by institution type (2013), EUR mil





Total number of  
private equity firms
France 8 079 39 528 34 722 82 329
Germany 9 630 18 743 7 150 35 524
Netherlands 1 859 11 646 4 622 18 127
Poland 547 3 763 296 4 605
Romania 11  - 179 190
Average Europe 2 275 15 359 4 184 21 818
Total Europe 56 873 383 981 104 588 545 442
Source: EVCA
Table 3.5. Average assets under management (AUM) per firm type (2013), EUR mil
  Venture capital firms Buyout firms Generalist firms
France 113,79 454,34 310,02
Germany 70,81 249,91 145,93
Netherlands 41,30 277,28 121,64
Poland 32,15 289,43 74,02
Romania 11,00  - 179,00
Average Europe 71,72 589,83 221,12
Source: EVCA 
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Figure 3.6. Divestments in 2013 by type, EUR th
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Figure 3.7. Venture investments in Europe by sector, EUR mil
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Table 3.6 – Total outstanding investments by country of the fund management team, EUR mil
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
France 8 551,10 3 456,84 5 958,53 9 264,06 5 247,33 5 943,94
Germany 7 115,10 2 618,58 4 825,68 4 439,42 5 315,33 5 908,43
Netherlands 1 763,20 805,42 1 326,49 2 101,13 1 362,16 988,83
Poland 727,33 482,18 504,43 692,16 540,59 351,52
Romania 122,58 82,86 80,34 48,07 24,28 48,45
European average 2 185,59 1 001,97 1 732,74 1 881,75 1 507,77 1 508,86
European total 54 639,75 25 049,32 43 318,53 47 043,79 37 694,13 37 721,58
Source: EVCA
Table 3.7. New funds raised by country of the fund management team, EUR mil
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
France 8 954,13 2 551,93 4 467,96 6 026,23 3 778,70 7 933,36
Germany 2 560,73 1 190,79 1 216,57 3 302,99 1 974,29 1 144,00
Netherlands 1 912,66 1 067,84 1 221,72 2 262,03 1 268,90 767,99
Poland 760,46 145,35 114,76 442,59 485,56 261,25
Romania  -  - 83,30  - 14,00 1,10
European average 3 219,00 756,54 871,89 1 664,14 983,18 2 144,30
European total 80 474,92 18 913,55 21 797,15 41 603,53 24 579,51 53 607,52
Source: EVCA
Table 3.8. Total Venture Capital investments by size of the portfolio company, EUR mil
# of employees 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0 - 19 1 654,46 1 119,02 1 224,57 1 316,54 1 299,25 1 235,36
20 - 99 2 807,32 1 836,47 1 699,54 1 670,45 1 452,51 1 747,38
100 - 199 939,07 354,78 470,05 516,67 353,86 256,20
200 - 249 269,93 162,23 36,84 31,02 6,05 69,06
250 - 499 357,82 178,86 189,87 111,45 28,52 63,95
500 - 999 196,12 110,43 30,83 48,95 21,10 8,47
1,000 - 4,999 74,66 61,21 9,69 0,14 45,54 1,78
5,000 + 9,55  -  -  -  -  -
Total 6 308,94 3 823,00 3 661,37 3 695,23 3 206,84 3 382,20
Source: EVCA
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3.3.1. Private Equity
European private equity investment activity is very 
diverse: the most popular sectors, where private equity 
(PE) firms prefer to invest, are life sciences, consumer 
goods & retail, business and industrial products, while the 
least popular are real estate, agriculture and construction 
(see Figure 3.4). In terms of industry investment trends, 
we can see a decrease of interest in construction, retail, 
communications and computer & consumer electronics 
from 2011 to 2013.
If we take a look at the breakdown of investments by size 
of portfolio company (Table 3.2), we can spot some no-
table features: while, on average, the total pool of invest-
ments is increasing – as is the number of employees in the 
portfolio company – some groups do not fall within this 
rule. For example, companies with 200-249 employees are 
suffering from severe underinvestment, while companies 
with 1000-4000 employees have the largest pool of PE 
investments.
Private equity is widely represented in France, Germany 
and the Netherlands, while in Poland and Romania, there 
are only 37 PE firms in total, according to EVCA data 
(see Table 3.2). Germany and France have 260 and 270 
PE houses, respectively. In France, however, the generalist 
firms dominate (in other words, they have a broad area 
of investment activity), while in Germany, more than 
50% of firms are VCs. The Netherlands has a relatively 
equal number of VCs, buyout and generalist firms, and in 
Romania, there is one firm of each type. 
France not only dominates in terms of number of PE 
houses, but also by the aggregate capital under manage-
ment of all PE houses – EUR 82.3 bil – while the four oth-
er countries in this study have a combined total of EUR 
58.4 bil. If we look only at venture capital firms, German 
firms prevail – with EUR 9.6 bil of capital under manage-
ment. French VCs also have a significant EUR 8 bil, while 
the Netherlands has EUR 1.9 bil, this being slightly less 
than the European average of EUR 2.3 bil (see Table 3.4). 
For the buyout industry, we see the same pattern: France 
and Germany are leading (but France has twice the capital 
under management), while the Netherlands also has a 
lower total of Assets Under Management (AUM) than the 
European average. If we look at the average AUM of PE 
firms in every country, we see that French firms are more 
concentrated, with (at least) two times more capital under 
management than the other countries in this study. At the 
same time, we can highlight that buyout firms have, on 
average, more capital under management per firm than 
VCs and generalists (see Table 3.5).
In 2013, France’s total private equity investments constitut-
ed 17% of total European private equity investments, while 
Germany’s made up 16% of the European total. There is a 
constant difference between funds raised and invested by 
private equity firms. In 2013, Germany’s new funds raised 
totaled EUR 1.4 bil. The Netherlands’ private equity sector 
investments made up 2.6% of total European private equity 
investments. There were 125 private equity funds head-
quartered in the Netherlands – more than the European av-
erage. In 2013, Poland’s private equity investments equaled 
0.93% of total European private equity investments. Thir-
ty-four private equity funds are headquartered in Poland, 
which is close to 2% of all European private equity funds. 
Romania’s private equity sector investments made up 0.13% 
of total European investments. Similar to the other coun-
tries, Poland saw its total venture peak in 2009, at close to 
EUR 42 mil invested. However, since then, total venture 
has dropped and was at around EUR 3 mil in 2013.
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According to Figure 3.6, the most common types of 
divestment among the countries of study are: sale on the 
secondary market (to another PE house), trade sale, public 
offering, and sale of quoted equity (after lock-up period).
3.2.2. Venture Capital
According to the EVCA data presented in Figure 3.7, 
the most attractive sectors for venture capital firms are 
life sciences, communications, computers and consumer 
electronics. Other relatively important industries for VCs 
are energy and environment, consumer good and retail 
services, and business and industrial services. For the 
period 2011–2013, some industries,such as energy and 
environment, communications and financial services, 
experienced a significant decline in investments from 
venture capitalists.
For European venture industries, the biggest share of 
capital invested accounts for companies with 0–99 em-
ployees (88% in 2013; see Table 3.8). More than 90% of 
VCs’ investees are small and medium-sized enterprises, 
and that share has increased over the past seven years. 
Thus, venture capital funds are one of the most important 
sources of financing of SMEs.
In 2008, French total venture peaked, with over EUR 1 
bil invested. However, since then, total venture has been 
fluctuating between EUR 600 and EUR 700 mil, currently 
being over EUR 700 mil (Table 3.9).
Currently, seed investments make up to 1.5% of total ven-
ture capital invested, which is a slight decrease from 2011, 
when it was 2.37%. In Germany, there was a significant de-
cline in later- stage venture investments from 64.7% in 2008 
to 54.4% in 2013. Similarly, there has been a shift of focus 
from later stage financing to start-up financing (Table 3.11).
In 2008, German total venture peaked, with over EUR 1 
bil invested. However, since then, total venture has fluctu-
ated between EUR 500 and EUR 700 mil, currently being 
over 700 mil (Table 3.11).
At this point, we cannot determine the trend in the num-
ber of private equity funds in Europe because EVCA has 
no available data from before 2013. In 2013, there were 
260 private equity funds headquartered in Germany, the 
second-largest in our study after France. Currently, seed 
investments make up 6% of total venture capital invested. 
This is an improvement relative to the last five years, when 
it was around 5%.
There was a significant decline in later-stage venture in-
vestments, from 55% in 2008 to 38% in 2013. The decline 
in later-stage venture is a consequence of a shift in inves-
tor focus towards start-ups (from 36% in 2008 to 55% 
in 2013) and, probably growth, limitations of later-stage 
firms (Table 3.11).
Similar to Germany and France, in 2009, Dutch total 
venture peaked at over EUR 300 mil invested. However, 
since then, total venture has steadily dropped, being close 
to EUR 200 mil in 2013 (Table 3.11).
Currently, seed investments make up to 3.51% of total 
venture capital invested. As in France and Germany, there 
was a significant decline in later-stage venture investments 
from 50.42% in 2008 to 32.59% in 2013. There is also a 
shift of focus from later-stage financing to start-up financ-
ing (Table 3.11).
In Poland, similar to the case of Germany, France, and the 
Netherlands, total venture in 2009 peaked to over EUR 50 
mil invested. However, total venture steadily dropped to 
over EUR 15 mil in 2013 (Table 3.9).
Currently, seed investments make up to 9.97% of total 
venture capital invested in Poland, being the highest 
relative share among the five countries. Like France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands, Poland saw a significant 
decline in later-stage venture investments, from 70.75% 
in 2008 to 58.39% in 2013. Similarly, there has been 
a shift in focus from later stage financing to start-up 
financing and, in Poland, also seed investments (Table 
3.11).
Currently, Romanian seed investments are non-existent; 
likewise, there are no investments in start-ups. The entire 
private equity market is focused on later-stage venture 
investments (Table 3.11).
Table 3.9.Total Venture investments, EUR mil
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
France 1 092,06 843,60 751,45 631,64 566,42 679,53
Germany 1 094,02 658,96 729,00 717,40 567,34 702,59
Netherlands 300,40 170,54 146,83 170,40 180,87 193,58
Poland 50,44 1,15 3,31 26,46 9,08 15,63
Romania 41,99 4,17 5,09 4,00 3,06 2,98
Europe - average 252,36 152,92 146,45 147,81 128,27 135,29
Europe - median 91,99 75,89 55,13 69,15 78,63 65,05
Source: EVCA 
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Table 3.10 – Average venture investments per company, EUR mil
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
France 1,88 1,71 1,50 1,43 1,48 1,44
Germany 0,90 0,62 0,66 0,69 0,64 1,00
Netherlands 1,94 1,05 0,83 1,09 1,10 0,97
Poland 1,00 0,19 0,33 0,81 0,32 0,30
Romania 9,68 1,04 2,54 4,00 3,06 2,98
Source: EVCA
Table 3.11 – Average VC investment per company by stage, EUR th
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Seed Capital          
France 1 000,87 1 568,77 699,90 554,90 913,06 623,63
Germany 469,63 366,94 236,31 252,25 214,90 253,96
Netherlands 317,05 1 207,08 536,26 375,17 373,56 523,39
Poland 382,72  -  - 161,00 247,24 67,78
Romania  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Startup            
France 2 073,30 1 413,02 1 684,17 1 569,57 1 625,29 1 594,83
Germany 1 005,77 829,63 896,56 963,03 743,33 878,62
Netherlands 2 171,54 932,14 914,79 1 019,66 752,50 922,95
Poland 527,31 259,01 226,58 891,46 207,44 247,28
Romania 1 086,11 1 042,44 1 904,32  -  -  - 
Later Stage            
France 2 563,79 2 142,37 2 112,35 2 161,63 1 916,26 2 088,85
Germany 1 230,19 675,16 845,74 854,08 959,38 1 863,28
Netherlands 3 320,21 1 007,50 1 034,41 1 873,62 2 159,21 1 467,34
Poland 2 099,24 126,74 424,04 1 389,18 494,34 570,45
Romania  -  - 3 184,84 4 000,00 3 055,00 2 984,00
Source: EVCA
3.2.3. Alternative Financing
Table 3.12. Total volume of Alternative Finance 








Source: The European Alternative Finance Benchmarking 
Report, 2015 
Table 3.13. European business angel investments
Year Amount Invested, € millions








Source: EBAN European Angel Investment Overview 
2012, EBAN Statistics Compendium 2014 
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France 41,1 4 320 0,0020%
Germany 35,1 1 510 0,0013%
Netherlands 9,8 810 0,0016%
Poland 6,6 160 0,0017%
Source: EBAN European Angel Investment Overview 
2012, EBAN Statistics Compendium 2014
In recent years, especially after the financial crisis of 
2008/09, the SME sector turned to alternative channels for 
financing. Alternative finance platforms range from eq-
uity-based crowd funding to peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, 
reward-based crowd funding and debt-based securities. 
Development and growth of alternative channels is a 
strong signal of excess demand for financing. Supply of 
financing by banks and other credit institutions seems to 
be too restrictive and regulated, directing excess demand 
to alternative sources of financing. 
According to the latest study by the University of Cam-
bridge and the consultancy Ernst & Young Ltd (2015), 
the French alternative financing sector grew by EUR 253 
mil in the past two years. This implies that the alternative 
finance market size grew by 167%. The current distribu-
tion of funds favors reward-based funding (36%), while 
equity-based is at 20%. The highest growth per platform 
was for P2P consumer lending. According to the study, 
in January 2014, France had 70 crowd-funding platforms, 
with increases of at least four new platforms each month. 
In addition, the study revealed that the majority of French 
think that regulations addressing the alternative financing 
sector are supportive.
According to the above-mentioned study, the German 
alternative financing sector grew by 144% in the last year 
alone. Between 2012 and 2014, alternative financing chan-
nels accumulated EUR 236 mil. These funds are available 
to the German SME sector, which is expected to increase 
its demand in the next few years. 2010 was character-
ized mainly by the significant increase in reward-based 
platforms, while in 2011, the highest growth (174%) was 
recorded by equity-based crowd funding directed towards 
start-ups and seed financing. According to the study, 58% 
of surveyed German users of crowd-funding platforms 
think that the restrictions and regulations are restrictive 
9 University of Cambridge and consultancy Ernst & Young Ltd, The European Alternative Finance Benchmarking Report, 2015.
10 https://www.euronext.com/
11 http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/ In June 2014, Euronext detached itself from ICE and from NYSE through an IPO. ICE sold the last of its shares in 




The Netherlands is among the top five European countries 
in terms of the development of the alternative financing 
sector.9 Between 2012 and 2014, the Netherlands accu-
mulated EUR 155 mil. At the same time, the Netherlands 
has the highest number of alternative financing platforms 
per capita. There are more than 100 registered platforms, 
with an associated rapid growth of credit unions and 
stock exchanges for the SME sector. Reward-based crowd 
funding saw the highest growth in last two years (211%). 
However, this is still at a low level of accumulated funds 
(EUR 4.4 mil).
The growth in Poland’s alternative financing sector is 
among the lowest in Europe. The total financing accumu-
lation is now at EUR 4 mil, which equals a per capita level 
of EUR 0.1. Relative to the UK, which has the highest 
growth and accumulation of alternative financing funds 
in Europe (EUR 36 per capita), Poland is still underdevel-
oped.
Investments by so-called “business angels” (informal 
investors) in Europe is progressively increasing, having 
risen from EUR 153 mil in 2010 to EUR 554 mil in 2013 
(Table 3.13). Considering the total number of business 
angels in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland 
alone (6800 BAs), there is a huge potential for further 
development.
3.2.4. Stock Exchanges
France has one stock exchange, Euronext Paris, which re-
cently acquired the corporation MATIF (Marché à Terme 
International de France).10 In 2013, the market capitaliza-
tion of Euronext Paris was EUR 1,670 mil.11
Euronext Paris, a public company, is the largest listing 
venue in continental Europe. It has raised EUR 104 bil 
and is the leading cash trading venue and the second-larg-
est listing derivate trading venue in continental Europe. 
Total market capitalization of French domestic companies 
was EUR 1.7 bil in 2013 (see Figure 3.9).
Germany has a total of 11 stock exchanges, of which the 
Frankfurt stock exchange is the largest. Other stock ex-
changes play significant roles in European trading: Eurex 
Exchange, RMX Risk Management Exchange and others 
in the Börse group, etc. The largest stock exchange had a 
market capitalization of EUR 1,762 bil in 2014.12 In Janu-
ary 2014, Deutsche Börse had 717 companies listed, with 
EOB value trading equaling EUR 108,718 mil. 
Euronext Amsterdam is the Netherlands-based stock 
exchange, as a part of the larger Euronext (Amsterdam, 
Brussels and Paris).13 
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Table 3.15. Market capitalization of listed companies, USD bil
Country Name 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
France 1 492 1 972 1 926 1 569 1 823
Germany 1 108 1 298 1 430 1 184 1 486
Netherlands 388 543 661 595 651
Poland 90 135 190 138 178
Romania 20 30 32 21 16
Source: World Development Indicators
Table 3.16. Market capitalization of listed companies, % of GDP
Country Name 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
France 51,04 73,21 72,78 54,80 67,86
Germany 29,57 38,02 41,90 31,57 42,07
Netherlands 41,65 63,23 79,05 66,54 79,09
Poland 17,02 30,99 39,91 26,36 35,82
Romania 9,75 18,45 19,65 11,61 9,40
Source: World Development Indicators
Table 3.17. Number of IPOs by country
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
France 5 1 4 13 13 11 22
Germany 5 3 11 11 7 6 10
Netherlands 1 1 2 - 1 1 8
Poland 7 2 3 4 6 12 6
Romania 1 - - - - 1 2
Source: Thomson One
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Table 3.18.Total amount issued by IPO, USD mil
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
France 50,6 1 215,5 380,7 223,1 304,9 1 533,8 4 426,7
Germany 1 062,8 94,1 1 000,0 1 415,0 1 753,9 3 191,8 3 663,7
Netherlands 2 170,3 1 495,4 148,2  - 1 063,7 333,3 5 439,0
Poland 1 186,0 2 154,7 2 846,7 2 369,9 888,9 1 466,0 268,0
Romania 22,0  -  -  -  - 193,0 606,1
Source: Thomson One
In 2013, its market capitalization was EUR 593,603 mil.14 
In January 2014, the Euronext stock exchange (including 
Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris) had a total of 1,060 listed 
companies and an EOB value trading of EUR 130,158 mil.
Poland has three stock exchanges, of which the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange is the largest.15 In 2013, the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange was the leader in the central European region in 
terms of the capitalization of listed companies, the value 
of shares and derivatives turnover.16
Romania has four stock exchanges, three of which are 
commodity exchanges. The largest is the Bucharest Stock 
Exchange.17In January 2015, its capitalization was EUR 30 
bil, with a total of 83 listed companies. In 2013, the main 
Bucharest Stock Exchange Trading Index (BET index) 
increased to 26.1%, placing the market in the top 15 stock 
exchange markets globally.18
With respect to IPO activity, French companies have the 
highest number of stock market launches (initial public 
offerings, or IPOs). In 2014, France held 22 IPOs, twice 
as many as in the preceding year. At the same time, in 
Germany, only ten companies went IPO, but average 
proceedings from German offerings are higher. In general, 
2014 was very successful for French, German and Dutch 
companies: they held 40 IPOs, with total proceedings 
reaching nearly USD 13.5 bil (see Tables 3.17 and 3.18).
The year 2013 was very successful for Polish companies: 
12 went IPO, but the average amounts issued were lower 
than in 2011-2013. Romanian public offering activity is 
very low: in the past five years, Romanian companies have 
had only 3 IPOs, totaling USD 799 mil.
3.4 Conclusion
Section 3 has provided extensive capital market descrip-
tions for each of the Research Countries. This section has 
also illustrated that banks’ lending capacity shrank during 





18 BESPOKE Investment Group. Last viewed: May 9,2019.
at a time when economic growth slowed. In addition, 
section 3 has also shown that equity financing, especially 
for the SME sector, declined in this period. In light of 
these findings, we conclude that the SME sector is facing 
limited access to financing, as a consequence of having 
to compete with other institutions in the market for a 
shrinking pool of financial resources. In the next section, 
we quantify the size of the financing gap as a difference 
between the demand and supply of SME loans and availa-
ble equity. 
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Appendix 3
Annex A: Macroeconomic Indicators
Table A1. France: Macroeconomic Indicators
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GDP nominal (tn EUR ) 1,94 2,00 2,06 2,09 2,11
GDP nominal (tn USD) 2,69 2,65 2,86 2,69 2,81
GDP per capita, nominal (th EUR) 29,97 30,73 31,51 31,84 32,01
GDP per capita, nominal (th USD) 41,63 40,71 43,81 40,91 42,50
GDP per capita, PPP (th USD) 34,94 35,87 37,31 37,11 37,87
GDP growth (annual %) -2,94 1,97 2,08 0,33 0,29
GDP deflator (annual %) 107,38 108,54 109,56 110,88 111,76
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 0,09 1,53 2,12 1,96 0,86
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) 9,10 9,30 9,20 9,90 10,40
Current account balance (% of GDP) -1,32 -1,27 -1,72 -1,54 -1,43
Trade (% of GDP) 49,57 53,97 58,17 58,14 58,05
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 1,00 1,47 1,43 1,15 0,23
Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 4,05 2,62 2,20 1,82 -0,01
Total reserves (bn USD) 131,79 165,85 168,49 184,52 145,16
Net capital account (bn USD) 0,46 0,06 0,01 0,71 2,40
Central government debt, total (% of GDP) 82,69 86,46 90,60 100,85 -
Domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) 125,25 128,64 129,40 132,54 130,75
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 108,48 110,68 112,64 112,70 111,35
Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) 108,45 110,65 112,60 112,69 111,34
Source: World Development Indicators          
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Table A2. Germany: Macroeconomic Indicators
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GDP nominal (tn EUR ) 2,46 2,58 2,70 2,75 2,81
GDP nominal (tn USD) 3,41 3,41 3,75 3,53 3,73
GDP per capita, nominal (th EUR) 30,00 31,50 33,00 34,19 34,85
GDP per capita, nominal (th USD) 41,67 41,72 45,87 43,93 46,27
GDP per capita, PPP (th USD) 37,21 39,56 42,38 43,17 44,47
GDP growth (annual %) -5,64 4,09 3,59 0,38 0,11
GDP deflator (annual %) 104,69 105,47 106,67 108,27 110,50
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 0,31 1,10 2,08 2,01 1,50
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) 7,70 7,10 5,90 5,40 5,30
Current account balance (% of GDP) 5,91 5,73 6,05 7,14 6,86
Trade (% of GDP) 70,76 79,41 84,78 85,97 85,32
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 1,66 2,52 2,37 1,43 1,37
Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 2,92 4,30 2,90 3,28 2,17
Total reserves (bn USD) 179,04 215,98 234,10 248,86 198,54
Net capital account (bn USD) -2,60 1,62 2,31 1,63 2,65
Central government debt, total (% of GDP) 46,04 53,74 53,32 55,18 -
Domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) 128,64 126,88 119,91 118,83 113,52
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 109,62 103,61 100,38 98,02 93,13
Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) 109,62 103,61 100,38 98,02 93,12
Source: World Development Indicators          
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Table A3. The Netherlands: Macroeconomic Indicators
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GDP nominal (tn EUR ) 0,62 0,63 0,64 0,64 0,64
GDP nominal (tn USD) 0,86 0,84 0,89 0,82 0,85
GDP per capita, nominal (th EUR) 37,36 38,01 38,51 38,24 38,26
GDP per capita, nominal (th USD) 51,91 50,34 53,54 49,13 50,79
GDP per capita, PPP (th USD) 44,58 44,75 46,31 45,41 46,30
GDP growth (annual %) -3,30 1,07 1,66 -1,59 -0,73
GDP deflator (annual %) 106,98 108,22 108,38 109,73 110,91
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 1,19 1,28 2,34 2,45 2,50
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) 3,40 4,50 4,40 5,30 6,70
Current account balance (% of GDP) 4,85 6,91 8,44 8,94 10,20
Trade (% of GDP) 120,32 135,55 146,17 154,98 155,55
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 3,99 -0,92 2,40 0,58 3,76
Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 3,30 8,29 4,49 -0,63 4,90
Total reserves (bn USD) 39,28 46,15 50,41 54,82 46,31
Net capital account (bn USD) -0,28 -4,22 -1,38 -12,62 -0,50
Central government debt, total (% of GDP) 53,94 57,66 61,79 67,89 -
Domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) 207,20 197,79 197,91 201,70 193,01
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 198,75 185,85 185,72 186,88 177,99
Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) 198,75 185,84 185,65 186,80 177,90
Source: World Development Indicators          
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Table A4. Poland: Macroeconomic Indicators
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GDP nominal (tn EUR ) 0,31 0,36 0,38 0,39 0,40
GDP nominal (tn USD) 0,44 0,48 0,52 0,50 0,53
GDP per capita, nominal (th EUR) 8,24 9,43 9,79 10,02 10,28
GDP per capita, nominal (th USD) 11,44 12,48 13,61 12,88 13,65
GDP per capita, PPP (th USD) 19,22 20,68 22,11 22,62 23,65
GDP growth (annual %) 2,63 3,70 4,76 1,76 1,67
GDP deflator (annual %) 113,88 115,90 119,58 122,23 123,65
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 3,83 2,71 4,26 3,56 1,03
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) 8,20 9,60 9,60 10,10 10,40
Current account balance (% of GDP) -3,93 -5,04 -4,91 -3,68 -1,35
Trade (% of GDP) 75,91 82,76 88,03 90,31 90,33
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 3,30 3,58 3,31 1,35 -0,87
Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 1,36 2,14 0,94 0,28 -0,82
Total reserves (bn USD) 79,52 93,47 97,71 108,90 106,22
Net capital account (bn USD) 7,04 8,62 10,02 10,96 11,97
Central government debt, total (% of GDP) - - - - -
Domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) 60,63 62,61 64,98 63,00 65,77
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 49,75 51,16 53,92 53,09 53,93
Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) 49,75 51,16 53,91 53,09 53,93
Source: World Development Indicators          
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Table A5. Romania: Macroeconomic Indicators
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GDP nominal (tn EUR ) 0,12 0,12 0,13 0,13 0,14
GDP nominal (tn USD) 0,16 0,16 0,18 0,17 0,19
GDP per capita, nominal (th EUR) 5,81 6,15 6,52 6,57 7,15
GDP per capita, nominal (th USD) 8,07 8,14 9,06 8,44 9,50
GDP per capita, PPP (th USD) 15,53 16,25 17,36 18,12 18,99
GDP growth (annual %) -6,80 -0,94 2,31 0,35 3,50
GDP deflator (annual %) 401,14 423,17 439,70 462,38 479,90
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 5,59 6,09 5,79 3,33 3,99
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) 6,90 7,30 7,40 7,00 7,30
Current account balance (% of GDP) -4,23 -4,40 -4,56 -4,42 -0,94
Trade (% of GDP) 67,24 76,57 85,40 85,15 84,53
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 3,00 1,94 1,40 1,55 2,17
Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 0,00 0,15 - -0,14 -0,03
Total reserves (bn USD) 44,38 48,05 48,04 46,71 48,83
Net capital account (bn USD) 0,93 0,34 0,99 2,46 4,30
Central government debt, total (% of GDP) - - - - -
Domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) 51,63 53,84 54,12 54,27 51,97
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 46,15 45,26 44,50 44,97 41,42
Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) 39,21 39,51 39,49 38,02 34,20
Source: World Development Indicators          
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Annex B: SME statistics
Table B1 – French SME statistics: breakdown by number of enterprises, number of persons employed and value-added
Number of enterprises
Size class 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 CAGR
Micro 2 187 173 2 044 743 2 368 047 2 417 700 2 460 145 2 439 919 2 408 614 1,62%
Small 122 613 123 924 121 159 124 815 132 583 136 364 139 392 2,16%
Medium 20 175 20 023 20 141 20 437 21 393 21 740 21 966 1,43%
Large 4 261 4 341 4 336  4 487 4 734 4 843 4 926 2,45%
Total 2 334 222 2 193 031 2 513 679 2 567 430 2 618 853 2 602 865 2 574 901 1,65%
% of SMEs in Total 99,82% 99,80% 99,83% 99,83% 99,82% 99,81% 99,81%  
All SMEs 2 329 961 2 188 690 2 509 347 2 562 952 2 614 121 2 598 023 2 569 972 1,65%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
Number of persons employed
Size class 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 CAGR
Micro 3 723 958 4 175 293 4 384 016 4 541 823 4 468 370 4 374 942 4 273 518 2,32%
Small 2 499 119 2 792 051 2 878 538 2 858 216 2 898 501 2 915 947 2 916 123 2,61%
Medium 2 066 341 2 280 633 2 340 538 2 299 785 2 306 624 2 295 614 2 273 748 1,61%
Large 4 842 835 5 424 771 5 605 200 5 613 139 5 648 395 5 641 783 5 601 283 2,45%
Total 13 132 253 14 672 751 15 208 234 15 312 855 15 321 888 15 228 285 15 064 673 2,31%
% employed in SMEs sector 63,12% 63,03% 63,14% 63,34% 63,14% 62,95% 62,82%  
All SMEs 8 289 418 9 247 977 9 603 092 9 699 824 9 673 495 9 586 503 9 463 389 2,23%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
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Value-added at factor costs, € billions
Size class 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 CAGR
Micro 228 924 195 644 228 230 242 350 248 883 252 906 254 207 1,76%
Small 154 690 144 186 146 629 147 800 147 795 148 178 151 820 -0,31%
Medium 132 158 130 336 130 519 133 101 133 092 133 281 135 275 0,39%
Large 348 724 341 772 366 383 371 163 372 973 376 560 383 662 1,60%
Total 864 495 811 938 871 787 894 443 902 742 910 922 924 964 1,13%
% of value-added in SMEs sector 59,66% 57,91% 57,97% 58,50% 58,68% 58,66% 58,52%  
All SMEs 515 771 470 166 505 378 523 252 529 770 534 365 541 302 0,81%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet 
Table B2. German SME statistics: breakdown by number of enterprises, number of persons employed and value-added
Number of enterprises              
Size class 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 CAGR
Micro 1 554 811 1 679 215 1 696 035 1 755 473 1 794 942 1 809 029 1 851 759 2,96%
Small 266 011 287 667 304 727 326 989 334 057 336 111 344 785 4,42%
Medium 45 995 51 973 52 839 55 116 55 909 56 004 57 771 3,87%
Large 9 727 9 504 9 704 10 532 10 600 10 608 10 717 1,63%
Total 1 876 543 2 028 357 2 063 308 2 148 110 2 195 505 2 211 752 2 265 035 3,19%
% of SMEs in Total 99,48% 99,53% 99,53% 99,51% 99,52% 99,52% 99,53%  
All SMEs 1 866 817 2 018 855 2 053 601 2 137 578 2 184 908 2 201 144 2 254 315 3,19%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet              
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Number of persons employed
Size class 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 CAGR
Micro 4 361 041 4 664 101 4 772 966 4 849 711 4 936 597 4 974 919 5 085 885 2,60%
Small 5 054 682 5 562 350 5 790 918 6 141 506 6 249 399 6 300 111 6 456 561 4,16%
Medium 4 596 565 5 013 423 5 116 121 5 364 286 5 421 232 5 445 644 5 604 904 3,36%
Large 9 193 936 9 060 552 9 214 342 9 847 317 9 899 155 9 941 295 10 068 893 1,53%
Total 23 206 226 24 300 428 24 894 343 26 202 819 26 506 379 26 661 970 27 216 240 2,69%
% employed in SMEs sector 60,38% 62,71% 62,99% 62,42% 62,65% 62,71% 63,00%  
All SMEs 14 012 288 15 239 874 15 680 005 16 355 503 16 607 228 16 720 674 17 147 350 3,42%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet              
% of value-added in SMEs sector 52,36% 55,14% 52,98% 53,78% 54,04% 54,42% 54,88%  
All SMEs 665 524 675 573 687 294 743 580 766 196 792 406 831 694 3,78%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet 
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Table B3. Dutch SME statistics: breakdown by number of enterprises, number of persons employed and value-added
Number of enterprises
Size class 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 CAGR
Micro 521 911 557 490 727 802 751 875 762 436 752 444 748 977 6,21%
Small 46 409 49 561 40 109 42 092 42 365 41 339 40 806 -2,12%
Medium 7 966 9 190 8 404 8 410 8 515 8 304 8 195 0,47%
Large 1 476 1 566 1 554 1 496 1 498 1 435 1 394 -0,95%
Total 577 762 617 807 777 869 803 873 814 814 803 524 799 372 5,56%
% of SMEs in Total 99,74% 99,75% 99,80% 99,81% 99,82% 99,82% 99,83%  
All SMEs 576 286 616 241 776 315 802 377 813 316 802 087 797 978 5,57%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
Number of persons employed
Size class 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 CAGR
Micro 1 388 522 1 341 110 1 519 099 1 507 162 1 508 916 1 506 629 1 510 479 1,41%
Small 1 197 697 1 157 080 1 050 140 1 068 770 1 063 392 1 051 731 1 046 811 -2,22%
Medium 1 060 263 1 022 696 992 900 1 010 503 1 012 328 1 003 497 1 002 794 -0,92%
Large 1 932 395 1 858 442 1 742 081 1 770 521 1 762 140 1 730 210 1 713 452 -1,98%
Total 5 578 878 5 379 329 5 304 219 5 356 957 5 346 775 5 292 067 5 273 540 -0,93%
% employed in SMEs sector 65,36% 65,45% 67,16% 66,95% 67,04% 67,31% 67,51%  
All SMEs 3 646 482 3 520 886 3 562 139 3 586 435 3 584 636 3 561 857 3 560 084 -0,40%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
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Value-added at factor costs, € billions
Size class 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 CAGR
Micro 61 433 56 345 63 642 64 171 61 486 60 538 61 854 0,11%
Small 61 979 54 740 55 550 59 159 57 655 57 947 58 621 -0,92%
Medium 65 871 70 256 67 920 72 012 70 809 70 494 72 015 1,50%
Large 107 736 106 673 113 478 115 415 116 484 117 653 118 400 1,59%
Total 297 019 288 014 300 590 310 757 306 435 306 633 310 890 0,76%
% of value-added in SMEs sector 63,73% 62,96% 62,25% 62,86% 61,99% 61,63% 61,92%  
All SMEs 189 284 181 341 187 112 195 342 189 950 188 979 192 490 0,28%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
Table B4. Polish SME statistics: breakdown by number of enterprises, number of persons employed and value-added
Number of enterprises
Size class 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 CAGR
Micro 1 464 089 1 358 017 1 392 002 1 431 525 1 426 780 1 407 427 1 397 391 -0,77%
Small 51 403 47 985 49 758 53 021 52 698 52 676 52 284 0,28%
Medium 15 567 15 559 15 447 15 266 15 016 14 850 14 559 -1,11%
Large 3 134 3 078 3 083 3 009 2 957 2 940 2 862 -1,50%
Total 1 534 193 1 424 639 1 460 290 1 502 821 1 497 449 1 477 896 1 467 097 -0,74%
% of SMEs in Total 99,80% 99,78% 99,79% 99,80% 99,80% 99,80% 99,80%  
All SMEs 1 531 059 1 421 561 1 457 207 1 499 812 1 494 494 1 474 953 1 464 234 -0,74%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet 
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Number of persons employed
Size class 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 CAGR
Micro 3 214 347 3 048 935 2 998 170 3 058 650 3 046 658 3 007 504 2 991 299 -1,19%
Small 1 122 407 1 086 725 1 090 171 1 122 123 1 118 579 1 121 510 1 121 608 -0,01%
Medium 1 629 887 1 621 901 1 607 878 1 577 418 1 559 044 1 550 098 1 536 157 -0,98%
Large 2 701 274 2 617 432 2 644 285 2 593 557 2 567 118 2 570 479 2 537 915 -1,03%
Total 8 667 915 8 374 993 8 340 504 8 351 748 8 291 397 8 249 589 8 186 980 -0,95%
% employed in SMEs sector 68,84% 68,75% 68,30% 68,95% 69,04% 68,84% 69,00%  
All SMEs 5 966 641 5 757 561 5 696 219 5 758 191 5 724 281 5 679 112 5 649 064 -0,91%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
Value-added at factor costs, € billions
Size class 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 CAGR
Micro 31 289 24 207 26 293 29 142 28 497 27 676 28 864 -1,34%
Small 25 442 19 272 21 850 23 888 25 763 27 067 28 270 1,77%
Medium 40 349 32 858 35 712 37 088 38 545 39 292 40 757 0,17%
Large 87 336 72 490 82 064 86 920 91 653 94 156 97 209 1,80%
Total 184 416 148 826 165 920 177 038 184 460 188 193 195 100 0,94%
% of value-added in SMEs sector 52,64% 51,29% 50,54% 50,90% 50,31% 49,97% 50,17%  
All SMEs 97 079 76 336 83 856 90 119 92 805 94 035 97 891 0,14%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
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Table B5. Romanian SME statistics: breakdown by number of enterprises, number of persons employed and value-added
Number of enterprises 
Size class 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 CAGR
Micro 450 396 439 351 394 660 353 057 358 943 373 944 380 975 -2,75%
Small 44 679 42 130 39 957 43 133 43 501 44 682 45 387 0,26%
Medium 9 506 8 165 7 624 8 148 7 766 7 669 7 496 -3,88%
Large 1 824 1 552 1 495 1 540 1 459 1 455 1 406 -4,25%
Total 506 405 491 198 443 736 405 878 411 670 427 749 435 262 -2,49%
% of SMEs in Total 99,64% 99,68% 99,66% 99,62% 99,65% 99,66% 99,68%  
All SMEs 504 581 489 646 442 241 404 338 410 210 426 295 433 858 -2,49%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
Number of persons employed
Size class 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 CAGR
Micro 1 027 442 966 217 879 419 850 618 872 249 931 091 962 767 -1,08%
Small 907 298 826 836 788 098 850 058 870 714 929 499 968 792 1,10%
Medium 970 225 833 068 776 301 829 318 813 958 848 216 855 924 -2,07%
Large 1 508 798 1 326 260 1 259 481 1 281 509 1 266 321 1 349 456 1 358 963 -1,73%
Total 4 413 763 3 952 381 3 703 299 3 811 503 3 823 240 4 058 264 4 146 444 -1,04%
% employed in SMEs sector 65,82% 66,44% 65,99% 66,38% 66,88% 66,75% 67,23%  
All SMEs 2 904 965 2 626 121 2 443 818 2 529 994 2 556 921 2 708 806 2 787 483 -0,69%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
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Value-added at factor costs, € billions
Size class 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 CAGR
Micro 8 495 6 439 6 521 6 193 6 470 6 987 7 513 -2,03%
Small 10 264 7 917 7 442 7 679 7 969 8 519 9 199 -1,81%
Medium 12 188 9 241 9 144 9 900 9 895 10 328 10 810 -1,98%
Large 27 897 20 838 23 313 24 483 24 665 26 492 27 583 -0,19%
Total 58 844 44 435 46 419 48 255 49 002 52 321 55 104 -1,09%
% of value-added in SMEs sector 52,59% 53,10% 49,78% 49,26% 49,66% 49,38% 49,94%  
All SMEs 30 947 23 597 23 107 23 772 24 334 25 834 27 521 -1,94%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
Table B6. SME distribution by sector
  France 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
B: Mining and quarrying 2 049 1 836 1 809 1 781 1 825 1 833 1 813
C: Manufacturing 210 005 205 450 210 664 205 468 211 813 209 083 206 732
D: Electricity, gas, steam and air condition supply 3 846 6 497 14 316 16 657 18 135 18 216 18 013
E: Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 10 464 6 557 12 119 11 575 12 807 12 861 12 718
F: Construction 437 502 403 565 456 427 463 814 501 388 495 038 489 693
G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycle 629 801 594 165 654 936 681 972 685 524 683 022 675 686
H: Transportation and storage 89 748 85 454 87 734 92 888 93 369 93 030 92 031
I: Accommodation/ food services 229 140 219 148 239 495 245 795 247 075 246 174 243 529
J: Information and communication 86 857 80 058 108 354 108 271 109 425 109 442 108 267
L: Real estate activities 159 699 146 032 149 628 153 658 153 086 151 749 150 119
M: Professional, scientific and technical activities 328 867 305 131 408 182 414 243 413 247 411 750 407 327
N: Administrative and support services 141 983 134 797 165 683 166 830 166 427 165 825 164 044
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
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  Germany 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
B: Mining and quarrying 1 696 1 638 1 811 1 744 1 734 1 715 1 647
C: Manufacturing 191 269 175 878 205 417 203 738 204 010 204 813 204 070
D: Electricity, gas, steam and air condition supply 1 427 1 504 1 558 1 604 1 604 1 587 1 575
E: Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 4 479 4 487 4 496 4 772 4 772 4 722 4 798
F: Construction 236 511 240 540 238 713 242 893 255 431 257 373 265 131
G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycle 451 995 575 405 564 878 579 942 587 502 588 284 617 871
H: Transportation and storage 89 021 86 785 86 823 88 932 90 650 90 771 91 951
I: Accommodation/ food services 172 843 217 057 215 821 221 868 226 154 226 455 228 139
J: Information and communication 83 625 83 183 85 558 92 362 95 488 96 938 97 799
L: Real estate activities 184 452 172 583 174 453 196 773 199 346 201 667 200 598
M: Professional, scientific and technical activities 332 960 337 307 347 485 372 001 385 872 392 274 401 471
N: Administrative and support services 116 539 122 488 126 588 130 949 132 345 134 545 139 265
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
  Netherlands 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
B: Mining and quarrying 312 311 305 306 318 317 329
C: Manufacturing 43 034 45 187 50 361 50 717 52 977 52 389 51 692
D: Electricity, gas, steam and air condition supply 541 673 661 687 746 746 768
E: Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 1 199 1 250 1 131 1 147 1 197 1 196 1 206
F: Construction 99 811 112 067 127 553 128 068 134 466 128 388 126 098
G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycle 159 523 163 875 193 097 195 712 196 099 195 434 196 678
H: Transportation and storage 25 186 26 019 29 769 30 107 30 082 29 981 29 933
I: Accommodation/ food services 36 056 38 513 44 319 44 557 45 344 45 189 45 837
J: Information and communication 28 645 31 642 52 865 56 923 57 863 57 440 57 525
L: Real estate activities 19 190 19 626 29 890 30 555 29 174 28 245 27 714
M: Professional, scientific and technical activities 129 398 140 866 201 569 216 211 218 164 216 276 214 245
N: Administrative and support services 33 391 36 212 44 795 47 387 46 886 46 486 45 953
Source: SBA Fact Sheet 
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  Poland 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
B: Mining and quarrying 1 349 1 503 1 745 1 977 1 911 1 977 1 976
C: Manufacturing 188 032 174 225 174 842 177 623 173 231 175 659 173 567
D: Electricity, gas, steam and air condition supply 1 703 1 992 1 973 2 436 2 662 2 757 2 765
E: Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 5 302 5 886 5 699 6 241 6 724 6 957 7 176
F: Construction 237 931 226 193 232 830 239 048 233 561 221 945 218 090
G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycle 579 115 506 827 524 412 525 337 516 188 510 826 499 408
H: Transportation and storage 148 546 131 766 138 442 145 744 145 046 143 538 142 502
I: Accommodation/ food services 63 185 57 677 49 962 47 833 49 410 48 897 47 705
J: Information and communication 48 534 51 611 55 212 59 845 63 161 65 614 67 486
L: Real estate activities 30 751 34 851 36 099 40 249 40 039 36 405 36 665
M: Professional, scientific and technical activities 184 930 181 941 185 874 200 269 208 232 206 501 211 071
N: Administrative and support services 41 681 47 089 50 117 53 210 54 329 53 877 55 823
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
  Romania 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
B: Mining and quarrying 1 061 1 215 1 150 1 091 1 079 1 214 1 195
C: Manufacturing 56 402 53 908 48 211 44 321 45 194 50 827 52 129
D: Electricity, gas, steam and air condition supply 451 556 835 874 997 1 127 1 172
E: Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 2 295 2 289 2 392 2 560 2 842 3 202 3 475
F: Construction 59 194 59 990 49 221 43 377 44 322 43 862 42 702
G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycle 213 944 197 439 181 753 164 951 166 126 168 655 169 324
H: Transportation and storage 34 382 34 967 32 678 31 616 32 217 32 709 33 579
I: Accommodation/ food services 23 631 26 151 24 379 22 186 22 943 23 293 24 475
J: Information and communication 19 990 19 588 17 625 16 260 16 668 17 496 18 073
L: Real estate activities 14 760 15 101 13 579 12 295 12 139 12 540 12 751
M: Professional, scientific and technical activities 59 132 60 369 54 311 49 499 49 701 54 000 56 239
N: Administrative and support services 19 339 18 073 16 107 15 308 15 982 17 370 18 744
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
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Table B7. Number of MSMEs by industry and size as of 2014, % of total SMEs 
  Germany Micro Small Medium All SMEs
B: Mining and quarrying 0,05% 0,19% 0,16% 0,07%
C: Manufacturing 6,94% 17,52% 26,27% 9,05%
D: Electricity, gas, steam and air condition supply 0,04% 0,14% 0,69% 0,07%
E: Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 0,12% 0,57% 1,11% 0,21%
F: Construction 11,65% 13,34% 5,91% 11,76%
G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycle 27,20% 28,65% 26,63% 27,41%
H: Transportation and storage 3,57% 6,26% 7,41% 4,08%
I: Accommodation/ food services 9,45% 14,21% 7,18% 10,12%
J: Information and communication 4,59% 3,00% 4,39% 4,34%
L: Real estate activities 10,60% 1,08% 1,00% 8,90%
M: Professional, scientific and technical activities 19,68% 9,73% 6,13% 17,81%
N: Administrative and support services 6,12% 5,32% 13,12% 6,18%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
  France Micro Small Medium All SMEs
B: Mining and quarrying 0,05% 0,38% 0,37% 0,07%
C: Manufacturing 7,10% 20,35% 33,20% 8,04%
D: Electricity, gas, steam and air condition supply 0,73% 0,27% 0,31% 0,70%
E: Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 0,45% 1,15% 1,76% 0,49%
F: Construction 18,82% 24,43% 11,19% 19,05%
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G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycle 26,70% 20,10% 20,57% 26,29%
H: Transportation and storage 3,44% 5,36% 8,24% 3,58%
I: Accommodation/ food services 9,63% 7,86% 2,47% 9,48%
J: Information and communication 4,23% 3,79% 5,10% 4,21%
L: Real estate activities 6,14% 1,28% 1,89% 5,84%
M: Professional, scientific and technical activities 16,31% 9,23% 7,50% 15,85%
N: Administrative and support services 6,41% 5,80% 7,40% 6,38%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
  Netherlands Micro Small Medium All SMEs
B: Mining and quarrying 0,04% 0,10% 0,33% 0,04%
C: Manufacturing 5,92% 13,59% 22,00% 6,48%
D: Electricity, gas, steam and air condition supply 0,09% 0,08% 0,37% 0,10%
E: Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 0,12% 0,48% 1,11% 0,15%
F: Construction 16,02% 12,77% 11,43% 15,80%
G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycle 24,32% 30,73% 24,05% 24,65%
H: Transportation and storage 3,53% 6,74% 8,98% 3,75%
I: Accommodation/ food services 5,62% 8,44% 3,31% 5,74%
J: Information and communication 7,35% 5,03% 5,32% 7,21%
L: Real estate activities 3,62% 1,21% 1,70% 3,47%
M: Professional, scientific and technical activities 27,83% 12,42% 8,59% 26,85%
N: Administrative and support services 5,54% 8,40% 12,81% 5,76%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
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  Poland Micro Small Medium All SMEs
B: Mining and quarrying 0,12% 0,38% 0,63% 0,13%
C: Manufacturing 10,94% 28,09% 40,94% 11,85%
D: Electricity, gas, steam and air condition supply 0,17% 0,44% 1,35% 0,19%
E: Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 0,42% 1,63% 3,39% 0,49%
F: Construction 14,96% 14,44% 10,63% 14,89%
G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycle 34,35% 31,10% 21,76% 34,11%
H: Transportation and storage 9,93% 5,71% 5,48% 9,73%
I: Accommodation/ food services 3,24% 4,03% 1,96% 3,26%
J: Information and communication 4,70% 2,74% 2,87% 4,61%
L: Real estate activities 2,48% 2,96% 2,87% 2,50%
M: Professional, scientific and technical activities 14,86% 5,51% 3,55% 14,42%
N: Administrative and support services 3,84% 2,97% 4,55% 3,81%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
  Romania Micro Small Medium All SMEs
B: Mining and quarrying 0,25% 0,49% 0,49% 0,28%
C: Manufacturing 10,34% 22,48% 34,04% 12,02%
D: Electricity, gas, steam and air condition supply 0,26% 0,27% 0,57% 0,27%
E: Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 0,71% 1,29% 2,23% 0,80%
F: Construction 8,92% 17,00% 13,50% 9,84%
G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycle 40,43% 30,40% 19,94% 39,03%
H: Transportation and storage 7,91% 6,54% 6,50% 7,74%
I: Accommodation/ food services 5,45% 7,49% 4,03% 5,64%
J: Information and communication 4,32% 2,91% 3,67% 4,17%
L: Real estate activities 3,16% 1,39% 0,89% 2,94%
M: Professional, scientific and technical activities 14,06% 5,14% 4,51% 12,96%
N: Administrative and support services 4,18% 4,60% 9,62% 4,32%
Source: SBA Fact Sheet
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Annex C: Financial Sector Indicators
Table C1. France: consolidated banking data
Number of credit institutions 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Stand-alone credit institutions  -  -  -  -  -
Banking groups 18 17 17 17 18
Credit institutions 18 17 17 17 18
Domestic credit institutions 15 14 14 14 16
Foreign-controlled subsidiaries and branches 3 3 3 3 2
           
Total assets of credit institutions in the sample (% of GDP)  
Domestic credit institutions 314,66 308,87 313,28 314,84 291,16 
of which:          
Large 301,65 295,95 299,85 301,93 285,85 
Medium-sized 12,82 12,70 13,37 12,84 5,27 
Small 0,19 0,22 0,06 0,07 0,05 
Foreign-controlled subsidiaries and branches 11,08 10,62 10,83 10,85 8,93 
           
Selected balance sheet indicators (% of GDP)    
Total assets 325,74 319,49 324,10 325,69 300,09 
Total loans and advances 178,07 180,22 176,14 173,70 171,68 
Total deposits 156,85 154,13 152,22 150,95 149,82 
Total liabilities 310,02 303,57 308,73 309,52 283,48 
Total equity 15,72 15,92 15,37 16,17 16,61 
           
Selected balance sheet indicators (% of the total assets)  
Total loans and advances 54,67 56,41 54,35 53,33 57,21 
Total deposits 48,15 48,24 46,97 46,35 49,92 
Total equity 4,83 4,98 4,74 4,97 5,53 
           
Profitability and efficiency      
Return on equity (%) 4,68 8,35 5,59 3,42 6,00 
Return on assets (%) 0,23 0,42 0,27 0,17 0,33 
           
Capital adequacy:        
Overall solvency ratio 12,24 12,56 12,23 13,99 15,01 
Tier 1 ratio 10,12 10,76 10,94 13,33 13,16 
Capital buffer (%) 4,24 4,56 4,23 5,99 7,01 
Total capital requirements (€ bn) 182,01 184,33 189,80 164,16 167,08 
Source: Eurostat          
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Table C2. Germany: consolidated banking data
Number of credit institutions 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Stand-alone credit institutions 1 750 1 709 1 700 1 675 1 647
Banking groups 50 40 37 34 35
Credit institutions 1 800 1 749 1 737 1 709 1 682
Domestic credit institutions 1 709 1 666 1 655 1 629 1 606
Foreign-controlled subsidiaries and branches 91 83 82 80 76
           
Total assets of credit institutions in the sample (% of GDP)  
Domestic credit institutions of which: 316,17 291,80 280,72 263,91 229,83 
Large 205,83 173,99 162,21 149,22 116,68 
Medium-sized 85,45 89,86 91,38 87,09 86,74 
Small 24,89 27,95 27,13 27,60 26,41 
Foreign-controlled subsidiaries and branches 35,05 14,72 15,51 11,24 9,91 
           
Selected balance sheet indicators (% of GDP)    
Total assets 351,21 306,53 296,23 275,15 239,74 
Total loans and advances 186,10 157,67 175,22 134,35 127,25 
Total deposits 193,29 164,78 159,52 150,75 142,36 
Total liabilities 338,00 294,64 284,71 263,45 227,91 
Total equity 13,21 11,88 11,53 11,70 11,83 
           
Selected balance sheet indicators (% of the total assets)  
Total loans and advances 52,99 51,44 59,15 48,83 53,08 
Total deposits 55,04 53,76 53,85 54,79 59,38 
Total equity 3,76 3,88 3,89 4,25 4,93 
           
Profitability and efficiency      
Return on equity (%) (2,17) 1,88 2,17 1,11 1,26 
Return on assets (%) (0,08) 0,07 0,08 0,05 0,06 
           
Capital adequacy:        
Overall solvency ratio 14,27 15,28 15,78 17,39 18,67 
Tier 1 ratio 10,63 11,41 11,72 13,80 15,19 
Capital buffer (%) 6,27 7,28 7,78 9,39 10,67 
Total capital requirements (€ bn) 238,74 206,81 206,24 195,09 185,38 
Source: Eurostat          
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Table C3. Netherlands: consolidated banking data
Number of credit institutions 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Stand-alone credit institutions 89 84 87 84 86
Banking groups 4 5 5 5 5
Credit institutions 93 89 92 89 91
Domestic credit institutions 30 28 29 27 29
Foreign-controlled subsidiaries and branches 63 61 63 62 62
           
Total assets of credit institutions in the sample (% of GDP)  
Domestic credit institutions of which: 409,57 374,33 391,01 376,90 350,30 
Large 347,87 311,26 324,04 309,43 285,25 
Medium-sized 61,34 62,61 66,52 66,98 62,23 
Small 0,36 0,46 0,45 0,49 2,82 
Foreign-controlled subsidiaries and branches 19,17 55,31 49,50 42,66 28,21 
           
Selected balance sheet indicators (% of GDP)    
Total assets 428,74 429,64 440,51 419,56 378,51 
Total loans and advances 300,72 306,34 298,43 289,63 278,89 
Total deposits 231,60 239,00 238,41 224,89 215,02 
Total liabilities 410,22 411,12 422,31 400,74 360,29 
Total equity 18,52 18,53 18,20 18,83 18,22 
           
Selected balance sheet indicators (% of the total assets)  
Total loans and advances 70,14 71,30 67,75 69,03 73,68 
Total deposits 54,02 55,63 54,12 53,60 56,81 
Total equity 4,32 4,31 4,13 4,49 4,81 
           
Profitability and efficiency      
Return on equity (%) (0,30) 7,47 6,05 4,12 5,00 
Return on assets (%) (0,01) 0,33 0,25 0,18 0,24 
           
Capital adequacy:        
Overall solvency ratio 14,96 14,11 13,74 14,49 15,27 
Tier 1 ratio 12,48 11,84 11,83 12,30 12,86 
Capital buffer (%) 6,96 6,11 5,74 6,49 7,27 
Total capital requirements (€ bn) 73,78 79,19 81,11 77,34 72,55 
Source: Eurostat          
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Table C4. Poland: consolidated banking data
Number of credit institutions 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Stand-alone credit institutions 641 638 638 638 634
Banking groups 1 4 2 2 3
Credit institutions 642 642 640 640 637
Domestic credit institutions 586 585 588 585 583
Foreign-controlled subsidiaries and branches 56 57 52 55 54
           
Total assets of credit institutions in the sample (% of GDP)  
Domestic credit institutions of which: 26,51 27,62 28,52 33,04 33,56 
Large - - - - -
Medium-sized 20,63 21,56 22,95 26,35 26,30 
Small 5,87 6,06 5,57 6,68 7,27 
Foreign-controlled subsidiaries and branches 57,27 55,75 50,28 53,74 53,18 
           
Selected balance sheet indicators (% of GDP)    
Total assets 83,78 83,37 78,80 86,77 86,74 
Total loans and advances 58,95 57,73 56,56 61,05 60,79 
Total deposits 57,56 57,38 54,16 58,80 59,20 
Total liabilities 74,76 75,02 70,84 77,23 77,15 
Total equity 9,02 8,35 7,96 9,55 9,60 
           
Selected balance sheet indicators (% of the total assets)  
Total loans and advances 70,36 69,24 71,78 70,35 70,07 
Total deposits 68,70 68,83 68,73 67,76 68,25 
Total equity 10,77 10,02 10,10 11,00 11,06 
           
Profitability and efficiency      
Return on equity (%) 7,02 9,98 12,03 10,76 9,97 
Return on assets (%) 0,75 1,00 1,24 1,20 1,12 
           
Capital adequacy:        
Overall solvency ratio 13,46 14,01 13,29 14,87 15,57 
Tier 1 ratio 12,10 12,59 11,88 13,14 13,96 
Capital buffer (%) 5,46 6,01 5,29 6,87 7,57 
Total capital requirements (€ bn) 13,79 15,22 15,77 17,74 17,74 
Source: Eurostat          
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Table C5. Romania: consolidated banking data
Number of credit institutions 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Stand-alone credit institutions 30 30 28 27 27
Banking groups 9 9 10 10 10
Credit institutions 39 39 38 37 37
Domestic credit institutions 7 7 7 6 6
Foreign-controlled subsidiaries and branches 32 32 31 31 31
           
Total assets of credit institutions in the sample (% of GDP)  
Domestic credit institutions of which: 9,60 9,48 10,50 6,32 5,62 
Large - - - - -
Medium-sized 7,94 7,99 8,83 4,54 4,16 
Small 1,66 1,48 1,68 1,79 1,47 
Foreign-controlled subsidiaries and branches 57,07 55,19 52,35 55,66 50,76 
           
Selected balance sheet indicators (% of GDP)    
Total assets 66,68 64,66 62,85 61,99 56,38 
Total loans and advances 44,44 41,40 39,54 37,37 32,76 
Total deposits 53,38 50,64 49,08 48,94 46,31 
Total liabilities 60,60 58,26 56,55 55,60 50,55 
Total equity 6,07 6,41 6,30 6,39 5,84 
           
Selected balance sheet indicators (% of the total assets)  
Total loans and advances 66,64 64,02 62,92 60,29 58,11 
Total deposits 80,05 78,30 78,10 80,98 84,12 
Total equity 9,11 9,91 10,02 10,31 10,35 
           
Profitability and efficiency      
Return on equity (%) 6,33 2,58 0,23 (7,15) 0,01 
Return on assets (%) 0,56 0,30 0,11 (0,64) 0,08 
           
Capital adequacy:        
Overall solvency ratio 15,76 16,66 16,81 17,24 18,79 
Tier 1 ratio 12,91 14,07 14,22 14,80 15,77 
Capital buffer (%) 7,76 8,66 8,81 9,24 10,79 
Total capital requirements (€ bn) 3,94 4,04 4,09 3,77 3,46 
Source: Eurostat          
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Annex D: SME Supply & Demand
Table D1. Sampling Weights per Firm Size



























FR DE NL PL RO
Distribution of rm size by country
Micro Small Medium Large
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Table D3. Loan size categories (attempted)
Country 











ents 12 62,5 175 625 2500
France
  Micro 32% 34% 24% 7% 3% 191 0,19 0,19
  Small 8% 40% 18% 18% 8% 370 0,37 0,40
  Medium 4% 11% 18% 44% 23% 879 0,88 0,88
Germany 
  Micro 34% 29% 11% 15% 133 0,13 0,15
  Small 8% 47% 22% 8% 16% 512 0,51 0,51
  Medium 0% 0% 0% 79% 494 0,49 0,63
Netherlands (wave 1)
  Micro 24% 17% 32% 27% 0% 238 0,24 0,24
  Small 0% 12% 43% 33% 12% 594 0,59 0,59
  Medium 0% 10% 0% 50% 40% 1 319 1,32 1,32
Poland 
  Micro 54% 19% 9% 10% 4% 186 0,19 0,19
  Small 0% 43% 0% 29% 29% 919 0,92 0,92
  Medium 0% 0% 73% 10% 7% 378 0,38 0,42
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Country 











ents 12 62,5 175 625 2500
Romania
  Micro 42% 58% 0% 0% 0% 41 0,04 0,04
Small 41% 0% 59% 0% 0% 108 0,11 0,11
Medium 23% 0% 0% 43% 34% 1 111 1,11 1,11
UK
Micro 88% 12% 0% 0% 0% 18 0,02 0,02
Small 29% 10% 40% 0% 21% 596 0,60 0,60
Medium 0% 0% 0% 35% 65% 1 850 1,85 1,85
Netherlands (wave 2)
  Micro 27% 0% 50% 23% 0% 235 0,24 0,24 
Small 0% 45% 12% 42% 0% 315 0,32 0,32 
Medium 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 625 0,63 0,63 
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Table D4. Loan size categories (obtained)
Country 











ents 12 62,5 175 625 2500
France
  Micro 31% 45% 11% 8% 2% 144 0,14 0,15
  Small 17% 39% 24% 13% 7% 321 0,32 0,32
  Medium 1% 20% 30% 36% 11% 574 0,57 0,58
Germany 
  Micro 35% 34% 15% 11% 5% 250 0,25 0,25
  Small 8% 21% 27% 33% 11% 549 0,55 0,55
  Medium 2% 16% 11% 32% 39% 1 212 1,21 1,21
   
Netherlands (wave 1)
  Micro 49% 19% 0% 13% 19% 580 0,58 0,58
  Small 11% 31% 28% 31% 0% 260 0,26 0,26
  Medium 0% 0% 15% 13% 72% 1 906 1,91 1,91
   
Poland  
  Micro 45% 32% 12% 3% 0% 62 0,06 0,07
  Small 16% 44% 14% 17% 4% 263 0,26 0,28
  Medium 1% 18% 11% 27% 23% 776 0,78 0,95
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Country 











ents 12 62,5 175 625 2500
Romania
  Micro 32% 34% 34% 0% 0% 85 0,09 0,09
Small 23% 21% 23% 19% 10% 422 0,42 0,44
Medium 4% 30% 18% 26% 19% 673 0,67 0,70
UK
Micro 33% 39% 11% 0% 17% 481 0,48 0,48
Small 17% 27% 12% 24% 20% 684 0,68 0,68
Medium 0% 6% 20% 26% 48% 1 411 1,41 1,41
Netherlands (wave 2)
  Micro 9% 15% 44% 24% 8% 441 0,44 0,44 
Small 0% 9% 13% 27% 51% 1 468 1,47 1,47 
Medium 0% 10% 0% 35% 55% 1 610 1,61 1,61 
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Table D5. Loan Size Categories (obtained) – All 100%
Loan Size Categories (obtained) -- ALL 100% Weighted Aver-
age Loan Size 
obtained in mil 
Euros
Country 
  <25K 25K - 100K 100K - 250K 250K - 1000K 1000K - 4000K
% of respondents 12 62,5 175 625 2500
France  
  Micro 31% 44% 12% 8% 2% 0,16 
  Small 19% 37% 23% 14% 7% 0,32 
  Medium 2% 19% 29% 38% 11% 0,59 
Germany  
  Micro 38% 34% 15% 9% 4% 0,20 
  Small 7% 21% 31% 28% 13% 0,57 
  Medium 2% 13% 13% 32% 41% 1,25 
Netherlands (wave 1)
  Micro 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0,01 
  Small 15% 40% 25% 20% 0% 0,20 
  Medium 0% 0% 0% 19% 81% 2,15 
Poland  
  Micro 47% 39% 10% 4% 0% 0,07 
  Small 19% 43% 13% 20% 5% 0,30 
  Medium 2% 22% 13% 34% 29% 0,97 
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Loan Size Categories (obtained) -- ALL 100% Weighted Aver-
age Loan Size 
obtained in mil 
Euros
Country 
  <25K 25K - 100K 100K - 250K 250K - 1000K 1000K - 4000K
% of respondents 12 62,5 175 625 2500
Romania  
  Micro 23% 50% 27% 0% 0% 0,08 
Small 19% 40% 19% 10% 10% 0,39 
Medium 4% 27% 17% 30% 22% 0,78 
UK  
Micro 34% 34% 13% 5% 14% 0,42 
  Small 13% 29% 16% 22% 20% 0,68 
Medium 0% 6% 21% 24% 49% 1,43 
Netherlands (wave 2)
  Micro 13% 23% 26% 25% 13% 0,53 
Small 0% 10% 7% 29% 54% 1,56 
Medium 0% 19% 0% 30% 52% 1,49 
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Table D6. Loan Size Categories (obtained), more than 75% (excess 12%)
Loan Size Categories (obtained) -- MORE THAN 75% (EXCESS 12%)
Country 
  <25K 25K - 100K 100K - 250K 250K - 1000K 1000K - 4000K Weighted Aver-
age Loan Size 
obtained in mil 
Euros
Excess Demand 
(+12%), in mil 
Euros
% of respond-
ents 12 62,5 175 625 2500
France  
  Micro 57% 33% 0% 10% 0% 0,09 0,1
  Small 0% 82% 0% 0% 18% 0,50 0,56
  Medium 0% 0% 0% 34% 66% 1,87 2,1
Germany  
  Micro 0% 54% 18% 28% 0% 0,24 0,27
  Small 0% 36% 0% 64% 0% 0,42 0,47
  Medium 0% 66% 0% 0% 34% 0,90 1,01
Netherlands (wave 1)
  Micro 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  - -
  Small 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0,63 0,7
  Medium 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0,18 0,2
Poland  
  Micro 56% 44% 0% 0% 0% 0,03 0.04
  Small 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0,18 0,2
  Medium 0% 23% 39% 19% 19% 0,68 0,76
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Loan Size Categories (obtained) -- MORE THAN 75% (EXCESS 12%)
Country 
  <25K 25K - 100K 100K - 250K 250K - 1000K 1000K - 4000K Weighted Aver-
age Loan Size 
obtained in mil 
Euros
Excess Demand 
(+12%), in mil 
Euros
% of respond-
ents 12 62,5 175 625 2500
Romania  
  Micro 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0,18 0,2
Small 52% 0% 48% 0% 0% 0,09 0,1
Medium 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0,06 0,07
UK  
  Micro 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 2,50 2,8
Small 0% 0% 0% 60% 40% 1,38 1,55
Medium 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0,63 0,7
Netherlands (wave 2)
  Micro 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0,18 0,2
Small 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  - -
Medium 0% 0% 0% 66% 34% 1,27 1,42
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Table D7. Loan Size Categories (obtained), less than 75% (excess 50%)
Loan Size Categories (obtained) -- LESS THAN 75% (EXCESS 50%)
Country 
  <25K 25K - 100K 100K - 250K 250K - 1000K 1000K - 4000K Weighted Aver-
age Loan Size 
obtained in mil 
Euros
Excess Demand 
(+50%), in mil 
Euros% of respond-ents 12 62,5 175 625 2500
France  
  Micro 8% 61% 18% 13% 0% 0,15 0,22
  Small 0% 43% 57% 0% 0% 0,13 0,19
  Medium 0% 32% 52% 16% 0% 0,21 0,32
Germany  
  Micro 69% 0% 0% 0% 31% 0,79 1,18
  Small 40% 0% 0% 60% 0% 0,38 0,57
  Medium 0% 32% 0% 51% 17% 0,76 1,14
Netherlands (wave 1)
  Micro 0% 37% 0% 25% 37% 1,12 1,67
  Small 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0,18 0,26
  Medium 0% 0% 39% 0% 61% 1,6 2,39
Poland  
  Micro 56% 0% 44% 0% 0% 0,08 0,12
  Small 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0,06 0,09
  Medium 0% 20% 0% 29% 20% 1,01 1,51
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Loan Size Categories (obtained) -- LESS THAN 75% (EXCESS 50%)
Country 
  <25K 25K - 100K 100K - 250K 250K - 1000K 1000K - 4000K Weighted Aver-
age Loan Size 
obtained in mil 
Euros
Excess Demand 
(+50%), in mil 
Euros
% of respond-
ents 12 62,5 175 625 2500
Romania  
  Micro 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0,01 0,02
Small 17% 0% 17% 50% 17% 0,76 1,14
Medium 0% 47% 53% 0% 0% 0,12 0,18
UK  
  Micro 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0,06 0,09
Small 60% 40% 0% 0% 0% 0,03 0,05
Medium 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% - -
Netherlands (wave 2)
  Micro 0% 0% 69% 31% 0% 0,32 0,47
Small 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0,18 0,26
Medium 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 2,5 3,75
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Table D8. Share of Dutch SMEs over surveys in 2013 and 2012
Share of SMEs by loan 
size
Applied and Obtaines a Loan Applied and Obtained or Rejected
100%  
of a loan
more than 75% 
(12% excess demand)




Applied and Got  
Rejected for a loan







48,56% 69,50% 45,20% 0,00% 7,28% 18,27% 51,44% 23,18% 36,53% 30,47% 46,32% 41,79% 69,53% 53,68% 58,21%
Small
 
75,78% 86,30% 76,95% 8,95% 7,85% 7,68% 15,27% 5,87% 15,36% 44,45% 47,28% 71,67% 55,55% 52,73% 28,33%
Medium
 
71,27% 56,90% 56,01% 5,97% 26,36% 29,12% 22,75% 16,79% 14,87% 62,17% 85,24% 92,04% 37,83% 14,76% 7,96%
Note: Def: Average loan demanded (EUR mil) is a variable derived from the SAFE ECB Survey (April-Sept, 2014), details in the note (3). In Method #2 in order to derive the excess 
demand for those firms that applied and did not get the ful loan demanded, we firstly derive the obtained loan weighted average (explained in note (3)) and add additional 12% and 
50% of that obtained loan respectively. In Method #3 we calculate weights using firms that applied and obtained a loan and firms that applied and gor rejected. Average loans for both 
categories in Method #3 we calculated as explained in note (3). Source: SAFE ECB, 2015.
Table D9. Netherlands SME Financing Demand Survey responses for 2013 and 2012
SME Loan Demand, % of SME need-
ing a loan 2013s2 2013s1 2012
Def % of SMEs needing a loan - is a share of fimms that answered ‘Yes’ to the SAFE ECB
Survey question regarding the neediness for bank of bark loans [equity] in doing business. 
However, in suverys 2013s1 and 2012 this queston has different wording. Tuming to the 
financing structure of your fim, to finance normal day-to-day business iperations or more 
speciic projects or investments, you can use internal funds and external financing. For each 
of the following sources of finarcing [ bank loan or equity], could you please say whether 
you used them during the past 6 months, did not use them but have experience with them, 
or did not use them because this source of financing has never been relevant to your firm? 
Used in the past 6 morths; - Did not use in the past 6 months, but have experience with this 
source of financing; - Did not use as this source of financing has never been relevant to my 
fim [INSTRUMENT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO MY FIRM]. The sum of weights of first two 
answers were taken as “yes”.
 Souce: SAFE ECB, 2015
Micro 43,39% 49,57% 53,33%
Small 52,69% 61,45% 61,21%
Medium 58,20% 65,16% 71,57%
SME Equity Demand, % of SME 
needing equity      
Micro 5,72% 8,16% 4,55%
Small 2,50% 8,77% 8,11%
Medium 4,44% 14,45% 13,15%
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Table D10. SME loan and equity demand estimate in the Netherlands, second half of year 2013
  Method #1 Method #2 Excess  Demand #1 Method #3
Excess  
Demand #2 Definition and sources 
SME Loan Demand  
A. % of SME needing a loan  









Def: % of SMEs needing a loan - is a share of firms that answered ‘Yes’ to 
the SAFE ECB Survey question regarding the neediness for bank of bank 
loans [equity] in doing business , details in note (1).Source: SAFE ECB 
(April - Sept, 2014), 2015. 
Small 52,69% 52,69% 52,69%



















Def: Average loan demanded (€ mil) is a variable derived from the SAFE 
ECB Survey (April-Sept, 2014), details in the note (3). In Method #2 
in order to derive the excess demand for those firms that applied and 
did not ge the full loan demanded, we firstly derive the obtained loan 
weighted average (explained in note (3)) and add additional 12% and 
50% of that obtained laon respectively. Table with the full details of mid 
points and weights is in Appendix Table.... In Method #3 we calculate 
weights using firms that applied and obtained a loan and firms that 
applied and got rejected. Average loans for both categories in Method#3 
were calculated as explained in note (3).Source: SAFE ECB, 2015. 





















Small   75,78% 8,95% 15,27% 44,45% 55,55%
Medium   71,27% 5,97% 22,75% 62,17% 37,83%
 











  Def: Weighted average loan-in Methods #2 and #3 we use within group shares, shares of firms by different loan size obtained, share of 
firms which obtained and were rejected for a loan, respectivly. Average 
loan demanded (€ mil) - variable derived from the SAFE ECB Survey, 
details in note (3). In Method #2 we derive excess demand, by adding 
additional 12% and 50% of a the average loan in corresponding groups 
(Appendix ??, Table??).Similarlly, In Method #3 we calculate weights of 
firms that applied and obtained a loan, and got rejected (Appendix ??, 
Table??). Average loans for both categories in Method#3 were calculated 








Small 0,26 0,20 0,70 0,26 0,25 0,30 0,59 0,59
Medium 1,91 2,15 0,20 2,39 2,09 1,91 1,32 1,32




Micro 752 444 752 444 
Small 41 339 41 339 
Medium 8 304 8 304 
D. SME Loan Demand=A*B*C (€ mil)   










Def: SME Loan Demanded is the variable derived as a product of varia-
bles A, B, and C in this table. 
Small 5 654 5 473 12 937 
Medium 9 213 10 096 6 373 
Total SME loan demand (€ mil) 204 121 298 498 (94 377) 97 094 107 027 Def:Total SME loan demanded - variable derived as a sum of loans 
demanded in D. SME loan demanded as % of GDPis equal to the Total 
SME loan demand divided by GDP (€ mil).  SME loan demand as % of GDP 31,75%       46,43% 14,68%     15,10% 16,65%
SME Equity Demand    




Micro 5,72% 5,72%  
 
 
Def: % of SMEs needing equity is a variable derived from the SAFE ECB 
Survey (April - Sept, 2014), details in note (1). Source: SAFE ECB, 2015. Small 2,50% 2,50%
Medium 4,44% 4,44%
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  Method #1 Method #2 Excess  Demand #1 Method #3
Excess  
Demand #2 Definition and sources 
B. Average equity demanded (€ mil) EVCA data ECB data    
Def: To derive the variable Average equity demanded - we use two 
sources. First is European Vencture Capital Association data (details 
in note (4)). As a second method we use the average obtained loans as 
proxy for demand for equity. We decide to use loans as proxy for equity 
demanded in order to capture possible variation between demand ac-






























 Def: Number of SMEs - is a variable counting absolute number of firms 
classified as SMEs in France in 2013. For exact definition of firm’s class 
size check Appendix 2.Source: European Central Bank, 2015.
Small 41 339 41 339 
Medium 8 304 8 304 
D. SME Equity Demand=A*B*C (€ mil) Def: SME Equity Demanded is the variable derived as a product of 
variables A, B, and C in this table. In the case of using EVCA data to 
estimate the equity demand we don’t make classification of that demand 
by firm size. Therefore, we use an average of variable A. (% of SMEs 
needing equity). In case of France that is 27%. In addition, we take the 













Small 1 003 257 
Medium 358 696 






Def:Total SME equity demanded - variable derived as a sum of equity 
demanded in D. SME equity demanded as % of GDPis equal to the Total 
SME equity demand divided by GDP (€ mil).  SME equity demand as % of GDP 0,21% 3,98%





mand#2Total SME Financing Demand *When Equity demanded is estimated using EVCA data     Def: Excess Demand#1, #2 are as a difference between estimated fin demand using Method#1 and Method#2, #3
Total SME fin.demand (€ mil) 205,481 299,859 (94,377) 98,454
 -
% of SME fin. demand as % of GDP 31,96% 46,65% 14,68% 15,32%
Def: Total SME financing demanded - variable derrived as a sum of 
equity demanded in D. SME equity demanded as % of GDP is equal to 
the Total SME equity demand divided by GDP (€ mil)
Total SME Financing Demand *When Equity demanded is estimated using ECB data        
Total SME fin.demand (€ mil) 229,737 324,114 (94,377) 122,71
 -
% of SME fin. demand as % of GDP 35,74% 50,42% 14,68% 19,09%
GDP (€ mil) 642,851 642,851   642,851   Def: GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in current € in millions.  Source: ECB, 2015
Notes: (1) The variable represents share of firms that answered “yes” to the SAFE ECB Survey question: “Are the [bank loan, or equity] relevant to your firm, that is, have you used it in the past or considered them in the future?”; (2) In Method #2 we classify firms that 
applied and obtained a loan by the size of the loan obtained. To do that we use the question from the SAFE ECB Survey: “If you applied and tried to negotate for a bank loan over the past 6 months, did you: receive everything; received most of it (between 75% and 99%); 
only received a limited part of it (between 1% and 74%); refused because the cost was too high; was rejected; or application still pending”. In Method #2 we only use the subcategory of first three answers as the full sample (“100% of a loan”; “more than 75% (12% excess 
demand)”;”up to 74% (50% excess demand)”). Then, we use those weights to weight the response to questions from note (1). In Method #3 we use all 6 answers (as the full sample) and group them into two categories (obtained and rejected) accordingly we weight the 
answers; (3) The variable represents weighted average of the 4 possible answers to the question: “What is the size of the last bank load that your enterprise obtained or renegotiated in the past 6 months?” Answer to this question is a category variable: (up to €25K; betwen 
€25K - 100K; between €100K - 250K; more than €250K - 1 mil;over €1 mil (here upper limit is assumed at €4 mil)). Next, in order to derive the weighted average of loan demanded we weighted the mid point of these categories with the share of firms that chose that 
category. The complete tables of weights and category mid points is provided in the Appendix table. (4) We use European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) to derive average equity demanded. The derived number represents an average of invested venture capital per 
investment, within a country, in a given year. Venture Capital investments include: Seed, Start-Up, Later-stage investments. More details are in Appendix.
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Table D11 –SME loan and equity gap estimate in the Netherlands, second half of year 2013
  Loans Equity Total Definition and Sources
SME Loan Supply        
SME Loan Supply (€ mil) 123,125     123,318 Def. Total SME fin. Supply - variable derived as a sum of loan and equity sup-
plied. Details are provided in the SME Financing Supply Estimate table. SEM 
fin. Supply as % of GDP - is equal to the Total SME equity demand divided by 
GDP (€ mil)
SME Loan Supply as % of GDP 19,15%     19,18%
SME Equity Supply        
SME Equity Supply (€ mil)       193      
SME Equity Supply as % of GDP       0,03%      
  Method#1 Method#2 Method#3 Method#1 Method#2 Method#3
SME Loan Demand     *Equity Demand using EVCA data
SME Loan Demand (€ mil) 204,121 298,498 97,094     205,481 299,859 98,454
Def. Total SME financing demanded - variable derived as a sum of equi-
tydemanded in D. SEM equity demanded as % of GDP is equal to the Total SME 
equity demand divided by GDP (€ mil)
SME Loan Demand as % of GDP 31,75% 46,43% 15,10%     31,96% 46,65% 15,32%
SME Equity Demand     EVCA data ECB data *Equity Demand using ECB data
SME Equity Demand (€ mil)       1,361 25,617 229,737 324,114 122,71
SME Equity Demand as % of GDP       0,21% 3,98% 35,74% 50,42% 19,09%  
  Loan Gap Equity Gap Total Fin Gap
  Method#1 Method#2 Method#3 Method#1 Method#2 Method#3
SME Loan Gap     *Equity Demand using EVCA data
Total SME fin. Gap (€ mil) 80,996 175,373 (26,031)     82,163 176,541 (24,864) Def: SME Financing Gap - is derives variable as a difference between estimated 
SME fin Supply and SME fin Demand for a given year within a given country. 
All variables needed to estimate the gap are calculated and explaines in detail in 
Supply and Demand tables on previous pages.
SME fin. Gap as % of GDP 12,60% 27,28% -4,05%     12,78% 27,46% -3,87%
SME Equity Gap     EVCA data ECB data *Equity Demand using ECB data
Total SME fin. Gap (€ mil)       1,168 25,424 106,419 200,796 (608)
SME fin. Gap as % of GDP       0,18% 3,95% 16,55% 31,24% -0,09%
GDP (€ mil)   642,851   642,851 642,851 Def: GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in current € in millions.  Source: ECB, 2015
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Table D12. Variables description for supply analysis
Name Source Description
GDP Eurostat Gross Domestic Product at current (market) prices
Total loans ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse 
The vaue of all domestic loans by non-financial corporations in all 
currencies combined at the end of the year
IMF, International Finan-
cial Statistics
Total outstanding loans represents all types of outstanding loans to 
non-financial corporations (household-related loans are excluded) 
by commercial banks, credit unions, financial cooperatives, other 
financial intermediaries and deposit takers
Total Equity EVCA (2014) Total Equity is a total value of capital under management of Ven-ture Funds in selected countries 
SME loans supply  
France
Financing SMEs and 
Entrepreneurs, An OECD 
Scoreboard (2015)
Total drawn and undrawn credit (credits mobilisés et mobilisables) 
for SMES (both independent and belonging to a group), comprised 
of short-term, medium-term, long-term, finance leases and secu-
ritised loans. A bank must inform the Banque de France Central 
credit register whenever one of its branch offices has granted more 
than EUR 25 000 to a firm (total outstanding loan)
Germany
Deutsche Bank Research, 
SME financing in the euro 
area: New solutions to an 
old problem (2014)
Due to data limitations, in order to calculate German SME loans 
outstanding, the share of SME loans in total business loans from 
2011 was used 
Netherlands
De Nederlandsche Bank, 
GfK Survey on lending 
and current accounts for 
SMES (2014)
In order to approximate SME loan supply for the Netherlands, the 
SME credit support provided by three largest banks was adjustted 
by the market share of these banks on the loan market
Poland CSO of Poland, Monitor-ing of Banks (2013)
Total SME loans in all currencies (as a part of total proposed loans 
to enterprises), denominated in the national currency and convert-
ed to EUR with average ECB exchange rate for the year 2013
Romania
Ministry of Public 
Finance of Romania, Cen-
tral Credit Register (2015) 
Loans granted by banks to SMEs in national currency (data refer to 
exposures higher than20,000 lei) and converted to EUR with aver-
age ECB exchange rate for the year 2013. The data was provided by 
National Bank of Romania.
SME equity supply  
SME Equity EVCA (2014) SME Equity is a sum of Seed, Startup, and Later Stage investments (Buyouts are not included)
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Table D13. Variables description for demand analysis 
Name Source Description
Number of micro-, 
small- and medum-sized 
enterprises
EC, SBA, Fact Sheet, DIW 
Econ (2014)
Total number of entreprises by size class according to the 
EU classification.
SME loan demand    
Average Loan Size De-
manded ECB (2015)
The value of average loan size demanded was received 
from ECB’s Survey on the Access to Finance (SAFE) 
research dataset by processing the data respective to the 
question Q8a: “What is the size of the last bank loan that 
your enterprise obtained/renegotiated/attempted to obtain 
in the past 6 months?” with the following answers:  
 
up to €25,000  
more than €25,000 and up to €100,000  
more than €100,000 and up to €250,000  
more than €250,000 and up to €1 million  
over El million  
DK/NA 
% of Enterprises needing 
a loan ECB (2015)
The value of % enterprises needing a loan was received 
from ECB’s Survey on the Access to Finance (SAFE) 
research dataset by processing the data respective to the 
question Q4d: “Bank loan (excluding subsidised bank 
loans, overdrafts and credit lines) - Are the following 
sources of financing relevant to your firm, that is, have 
you used them in the past or considered using them in the 
future?” with the following answers:  
yes, this source is relevant to my enerprise 
no, this source is not relevant to my enerprise 
DK/NA
SME equity demand  
Average Equity Size 
Demanded EVCA (2014
The value of average equity size demanded is estmated as 
the average VC’s investment per company
Average Equity Size 
Demanded ECB(2015)
The value of average equity size demanded was received 
from ECB’s Survey on fhe Access to Finance (SAFE) 
research dataset by processing the data respective to fhe 
question Q8a: “What is the size of the last bank loan that 
your enterprise obtained/renegotiated/attempted to obtain 
in the past 6 morths?”. Here we are makang an assumpton 
that enterprises’ needs for capital are not dependent on 
the kind of capital (debt or equity)
% of Enterprises Equity 
capital ECB(2015)
The value of % enterprises needing equity capital was 
received from ECB’s Survey on the Access to Finance 
(SAFE) research dataset by processing the data respective 
to the question Q4j: “Equity capital - Are the following 
sources of firancing relevant to your firm,that is, have you 
used them in the past or considered using them in the 
future?” with the following answers:  
yes, this source is relevant to my enterprise 
no, this source is not relevant to my enterprise 
DK/NA
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Appendix 4
5. Fundamental Creditor & Shareholder 
Protection
5.1 Overview
The recent financial crisis revealed corporate governance 
flaws in banks and financial institutions across Europe. 
As such, European countries have started to implement 
a range of governance reforms to better prepare for risks 
and enhance firm performance. While the introduction of 
reforms is widespread, they are not always easy to imple-
ment uniformly across nations. Furthermore, complying 
with regulation may be detrimental to stimulating the 
growth of SMEs. There are significant differences across 
countries in terms of their economic situations and how 
governments choose to regulate economic activities. La 
Porta et al. (1998) provide evidence of the variation across 
countries, explaining how firms’ financial performance is 
affected.19 In poorly regulated countries, companies are 
at a disadvantage in raising capital. However, companies 
might be expected to work harder to attract external capi-
tal by offering better corporate governance.
Capital markets in some parts of Europe continue to lag 
behind the rest of the world. In these regions, there has 
been little dynamism in the rest of the financial markets. 
Previous chapters expressed some concern that capital 
markets in these countries are not yet a real source of 
financing and have failed to sustain business growth. Sev-
eral hypotheses could explain this situation. First, there 
is an important relationship between macroeconomic 
and political stability and the development of a country’s 
financial markets.20 The past economic and political insta-
bility in Romania and Poland may help explain the extent 
of underperformance in those countries, given the level 
of macroeconomic fundamentals. While [the lack of?] 
economic openness is a relevant and pervasive obstacle to 
capital market development, effective public policy must 
go beyond simply identifying ad hoc macroeconomic 
factors of capital market development. Second, capital 
markets in areas without high-quality investor protection 
rights, measured by the quality of legal rules, may well 
be underdeveloped in terms of financial market develop-
ment. The problem stems from the need to also improve 
courts and other conflict- resolution mechanisms and 
legal procedures to improve the financial environment for 
banks and other financial intermediaries. 
The third factor is the concern that even the strongest cap-
ital markets face serious challenges and may not be suf-
ficiently developed. On this, Rajan and Zingales (1998a) 
show that companies in countries with robust financial 
19 La Porta et al. (1998).
20 La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998). 
21 Townsend (1979); Aghion and Bolton (1992); Hart and Moore (1994, 1998).
22 Jaffee and Russell (1976); Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
23 See Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009) for a recent survey of empirical studies on the use of collateral to mitigate credit rationing.
systems often develop a higher dependence on external 
financing. In order to provide a strong foundation for fi-
nancial market development, this chapter will discuss the 
legal and institutional factors for the proper functioning 
of well-developed debt and equity markets. An argument 
that we find quite compelling is that, in order for SMEs to 
enhance their own growth, there is a need for equity cap-
ital financing. Higher levels of equity financing have the 
potential to increase external growth, leading to increases 
in the business and management skills of SMEs and im-
proving their corporate governance and financial skills. 
This section discusses the most important conditions for 
the proper functioning of debt and equity capital markets.
5.2 Debt Capital Markets
As noted above, an effective legal and regulatory frame-
work promotes access to external financing while rein-
forcing financial stability. One of the insights of a well-de-
veloped debt market is that creditor rights are relatively 
strong, and credit information can be expected to reduce 
asymmetrical information. Recent research on debt 
markets lends insight into the effect of creditors’ rights on 
SMEs’ access to different forms of lending. 
5.2.1. Creditor Rights
Creditors’ rights, embedded in domestic bankruptcy and 
reorganization laws, are crucial for creditors to participate 
in the loan market. As such, obtaining credit facilities 
depends on the environment, which includes the powers 
of creditors and the information that they have on the 
debtor. The first condition refers to forcing repayment, 
having collateral or gaining control.21 The second condi-
tion refers to the presence of asymmetric information and 
legal uncertainties on the side of the lender.22 Credit can 
be extended if the asymmetric information is reduced by 
increasing the probability of loan repayment by, for exam-
ple, providing collateral.23 
It is impossible to overestimate the importance of cred-
itors’ rights. In a strong legal framework, creditors find 
it easier to secure their rights, obtain greater liquidation 
valuations for their firms and obtain credit at lower rates 
of interest. From a trend perspective, Table 5.1, Panel B 
shows there have been very few changes implemented in 
the Research Countries. To be sure, some governments, 
such as Romania’s, have implemented a series of creditor 
rights reforms. In most cases, implementing new legisla-
tion creates additional protection for creditors. However, 
the World Bank recently observed that in the case of the 
Romanian Civil Code, there are a number of updates 
and changes that will benefit debtors and negatively 
impact creditors; these include invalidation of material, 
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an adverse change provision, and enhanced powers to 
negotiate an agreement on the basis of simple economic 
grounds. Turning to the other Research Countries, the 
creditor rights regimes in Germany and the Netherlands 
are among the most stringent. In contrast, France remains 
one of the weakest creditor rights regimes.
Typically, countries provide combinations of different 
legal procedures. Indeed, some countries depend on more 
than one procedure. In this context, La Porta et al. (1998) 
establish a creditor rights index that consists of the sum of 
the reorganization and liquidation procedures. The index 
is the sum of the following variables: 1) automatic stay on 
the assets24; 2) the right to collateral in reorganization25; 3) 
filing for reorganization without creditor consent26; and 4) 
management stays pending the resolution of the reorgan-
ization procedure. Djankov et al. (2007) update the score 
of the index. They investigate the determinants of private 
credit and find that creditor protection is correlated with 
higher ratios of private credit, where the legal origin is 
an important determinant.27 Overall, the creditor rights 
index indicates that legal and institutional arrangements 
may affect the size of a country’s debt market and the 
probability that a firm will receive credit.
5.2.2. Enforcement rights of creditors
In this section, we extend our earlier discussion to the 
enforcement of creditor rights. Creditor rights are com-
plex because creditors can exercise them in different ways. 
Moreover, there are many different kinds of creditors with 
different sets of interests. For instance, when a company 
faces severe financial distress resulting in a default, senior 
secured creditors will cash out by selling the collateral, 
whereas junior unsecured creditors will continue to favor 
the company as a going concern in the hope that the firm 
will become profitable again.
As indicated above, this section will assess creditor rights 
from the perspective of senior secured creditors when 
the firm is defaulting. In this context, there are three 
enforcement procedures: reorganization, liquidation and 
foreclosure. These procedures vary across countries. For 
example, in some countries, it is more difficult for secured 
creditors to cash out the collateral. Such creditors can still 
attempt to liquidate their collateral through their voting 
rights in the context of reorganization. Some debt en-
forcement instruments require the involvement of courts, 
particularly in the case of multiple creditors.28 There is 
also an extensive debate over which procedure is the more 
24 This rule prevents secured creditors from cashing out the collateral and protects managers and unsecured creditors against these secured creditors, 
which leads to avoiding automatic liquidation.
25 Secured creditors are paid after the government and employees.
26 This is similar to the US’s Chapter 11, which offers management enormous power by delaying creditors in gaining possession of collateral.
27 Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, “Private Credit in 129 Countries,” 2007.
28 Foreclosure procedures do not require courts to be involved. 
29 “Debt Enforcement Around the World,” by Djankov et al., Journal of Political Economy, Dec 2008.
30 La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1998). “Law and Finance.” Journal of Political Economy, 106(6): 
1113–55.
socially desirable: reorganization or liquidation (Aghion, 
Hart, and Moore 1992). Djankov et al. (2008) measure 
the efficiency of debt enforcement mechanisms across 129 
countries, including the Research Countries.29 They use 
the following measures to predict the development of the 
debt market: 1) time to payment; 2) cost; 3) efficiency; 4) 
recovery; and 5) specialized courts.
Table 5.2 presents the range of commonly used debt 
enforcement procedures in the respective jurisdictions. 
Three countries—France, Romania and the US—use 
the reorganization procedure. While France is similar 
to the US in terms of duration, its procedure is slightly 
more costly, much less efficient and less successful than 
recovery efforts in the US. The Romanian procedure, 
in contrast, has the lowest efficiency and recovery score 
among the Research Countries. In contrast, the liquida-
tion procedure in the Netherlands is the cheapest and has 
the highest efficiency and recovery scores. Poland has the 
least effective liquidation procedure among the Research 
Countries. 
5.3 Equity Capital Markets
While the level of shareholder protection in Europe has 
improved over the last decade, lower levels of shareholder 
protection nevertheless persist in some countries. In fact, 
not only do lower levels of shareholder protection and 
transparency make the investment decision-making pro-
cess more expensive, but they may also make it harder to 
detect fraud and other governance problems. As a result, 
there is a relationship between the level of protection and 
the level of participation by investors within the financial 
markets (La Porta et al., 1996)30. They show, for example, 
that countries with a common law background have the 
highest level of protection. In contrast, French civil law 
countries have the lowest level of protection, which may 
explain the differences in the availability of external capi-
tal financing.
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Table 5.1. Panel A. Creditor Rights





for going into 
reorganization
Management 
does not stay in 
reorganization
Creditor rights
UK 1 1 1 1 4
US 0 1 0 0 1
France 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 1 1 1 0 3
Romania 0 1 1 0 3
Germany - - - - -
Poland - - - - -
World Average 0,49 0,81 0,55 0,45 2,3
Source: La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 1998, “Law and Finance.” 
Journal of Political Economy, 106 (6): 1113-5.
Table 5.1. Panel B. Creditor Rights





for going into 
reorganization
Management 




UK 1 1 1 1 4
US 0 1 0 0 1
France 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 1 1 1 0 3
Romania 0 1 1 0 3
Germany - 1 - - 1
Poland - 1 1 1 3
World Average n/a n/a n/a n/a 1,8
Source:First Column: Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifier Private Credit in 129 Countries, 2007. Note: In 1985 the U.K. 
added the right in the fourth column and Romania added in 2003 the right in the first column. n/a means not availablle 
Table 5.2. Most Commonly Used Debt Enforcement Procedure
Country Procedure Time to 
payment
Cost Efficiency Recovery Specialized 
Court
UK Foreclosure 1,00 0,06 92,30 92,30 0
US Reorganization 2.00 0,07 85,80 85,80 1
France Reorganization 1,90 0,09 54,10 46,60 0
Germany Liquidation 1,20 0,08 57,00 57,00 1
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Country Procedure Time to 
payment
Cost Efficiency Recovery Specialized 
Court
Netherlands Liquidation 1,70 0,01 94,90 94,90 1
Poland Liquidation 2,00 0,22 67,70 46,90 1
Romania Reorganization 4,60 0,09 11,00 7,90 1
World average           0,26
Foreclosure 2,28 0,11 52,44 46,70
  Liquidation 2,70 0,16 50,16 45,90  
Reorganization 2,84 0,13 52,93 46,50  
Source: Debt Enforcement Around the World, by Djankov et al., Journal of Political Economy, Dec 2008. 
Table 5.3 Panel A. Shareholder Rights



















UK 1 1 0 1 1 0,1 5
US 1 1 1 1 0 0,1 5
France 1 0 0 0 1 0,1 3
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 1 0,1 2
Romania - - - - - -  - 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0,05 1
Poland - - - - - -  - 
World average 0,18 0,71 0,27 0,53 0,53 0,11 3
Source: La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 1998, “Law and Finance.” 
Journal of Political Economy, 106 (6): 1113-55.
Table 5.3 Panel B. Shareholder Rights



















UK 1 1 0 1 1 0,1 5
US 1 1 0 1 0  - 3
France 1 0 0 0,5 1 0,05 3,5
Netherlands 0 0 0 0,5 1 0,1 2,5
Romania 0 1 1 1 1 0,1 5
Germany 1 0 0 0,5 1 0,05 3,5
Poland 0 0 0 0 1 0,1 2
World average 0,35 0,63 0,25 0,49 0,76 0,1 3,29
Source: Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, 2008, “The law and economics of 
self-dealing.” Journal of Financial Economics 88 (2008) 430-465 
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Table 5.4 – Regulation of Securities Markets
Country Disclosure Requirements Liability Standard Public Enforcement
UK 0,83 0,66 0,68
US 1,00  1.00 0,90
France 0,75  0.22 0,77
Netherlands 0,50 0,89 0,47
Romania  -  -  - 
Germany 0,42 0,00 0,22
Poland -  -  - 
World average 0,60 0,47 0,52
Source: La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleiffer,A. (2006), What Works in Securities Laws? The Journal of Finance, 
61:1- 32.
Table 5.5. Anti-self-Dealing-Index
Country Ex-ante private control of 
self-dealing
Ex-post private control of 
self-dealing
Anti-self-dealing Index
UK 1,00 0,90 0,95
US 0,33 0,98 0,65
France 0,08 0,68 0,38
Netherlands 0,06 0,35 0,20
Romania 0,33 0,55 0,44
Germany 0,14 0,43 0,28
Poland 0,25 0,33 0,29
World average 0,36 0,52 0,44
Source: Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleiffer, 2008, “The law and economics of 
self-dealing.” Journal of Financial Economics 88 (2008) 430-465
Table 5.6. Enforcement of Laws









UK 10 8,57 9,12 78 3,24 2,58
US 10 10 8,63 71 2,32 2,62
Germany 9 9,23 8,93 62 3,39 3,51
France 8 8,98 9,05 69 1,5 3,23
Netherlands 10 10 10 64 3,61 3,07
Poland -  - 7,36  -  - 4,15
Romania -  - 4,93  -  - 4,42
World average 7,67 6,85 6,24 60,93 3,47 3,53
Source: The First, second and fourth column are from: La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert W.Vishny. 1998. “Law and Finance.” Journal of Political Economy, 106(6): 1113-55. The third and last column 
ae from: Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer., 2003. “Courts.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118(2): 453-517. The fifth column is from: Balas, Aron, Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2009. “The Divergence of Legal Procedures.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 
1 (2): 138-162.
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5.3.2. Shareholder Rights
La Porta et al. (1996) examine the legal rules concerning 
shareholder protection, showing that there are numerous 
differences in company law across countries.31 Note that 
the laws in different countries are typically not writ-
ten from scratch, but are transplanted – voluntarily or 
coincidentally – from a few legal families or traditions. 
In general, there are two traditions: common law and 
civil law. Countries with a common law background have 
the highest and French civil law the lowest shareholder 
protection. The scores of German civil law countries lie 
between common law and French civil law. In terms of 
categorization, some of the Research Countries have 
different legal origins, which may partially account for the 
differences in equity markets.
Table 5.3, Panels A and B depict the differences in 
shareholder rights.32 The evidence shows that, although 
there have been very few changes across the Research 
Countries, we do observe some changes. For example, 
Germany, which has a bank-based financial structure, 
has taken initiatives to provide shareholders with more 
rights. Across both Panel A and Panel B, we see that the 
UK is uniformly ranked the highest, with Germany and 
France being second highest, while Poland has the lowest 
index score. Overall, the differences in shareholder rights 
suggest that most countries provide a relatively strong 
shareholder-friendly environment.
5.3.3. Securities Law
Securities laws aim to regulate the behavior of participants 
in financial markets. La Porta et al. (2006) show that abuse 
by market participants can be mitigated by empowering 
financial supervisors and/or by providing a higher level of 
disclosure and enforcement standards. The main securi-
ties law addresses the “promoter’s problem,” which refers 
to issuers selling bad securities to outside investors.33 La 
Porta et al. (2006) look at the legal provisions governing 
IPOs and suggest that disclosure and liability standards 
matter because they facilitate private contracting rather 
than pubic enforcement. Based on the idea that legal 
origin is a strong predictor of investor protection, we first 
examine the effect of securities market laws in the context 
of our Research Countries. 
Table 5.4 shows that there is significant variation among 
the Research Countries, reflecting the financial market 
and property rights orientation of these countries.34 
The first two columns provide the scores relative to the 
compulsory disclosures of potential conflicts of interest 
31 La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1998). “Law and Finance.” Journal of Political Economy, 106(6): 
1113–55.
32 For an explanation, see La Porta et al. (1998).
33 (Mahoney (1995)
34 The La Porta et al. (2006) sample includes the 49 countries with the largest stock market capitalization in 1993 (the La Porta et al. (1998) original 
sample), as does La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998).
35  Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2008). “The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing.” Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol. 88 (2008), pp. 430–465.
around the IPO and the liability standards against issuers 
and directors, distributors, and accountants involved in 
the offering. The last column provides scores of the regu-
lator or financial supervisor’s powers. For definitions, see 
Appendix E. 
Another important indicator of shareholder rights is 
the anti-self-dealing index developed by Djankov et al. 
(2008).35 This index is a good measure for explaining the 
variety of stock market activities. Table 5.5 presents scores 
on the regulation of self-dealing.
Table 5.5 indicates significant variation among the 
countries between ex-ante and ex-post enforcement of 
self-dealing. The first column shows the ex-ante mech-
anisms against self-dealing, which measure the approv-
al and mandatory disclosure requirements before the 
transaction is closed. The index includes the independent 
review of transactions. Again, given the bank-financing 
orientation of most of the Research Countries, this is 
reflected in the scores in Table 5.5. The ex-post private 
control of self-dealing refers to the situation of disclosures 
after the transaction is closed. In this context, share-
holders may have proof of wrongdoing and could seek 
compensation.
5.4 Enforcement of Laws
The enforcement of these rights is a requirement for the 
development of a well-functioning stock market. A weak 
enforcement environment will ultimately limit the extent 
to which laws can be effective. Table 5.6 provides several 
proxies for the quality of law enforcement in the Research 
Countries, the UK and the US. We use the following 
measures: efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, 
corruption, risk of expropriation, and risk of contract 
repudiation The first two of these proxies relate to the 
law enforcement mechanism, while the others provide an 
indication of the government’s attitude towards business. 
In addition, Table 5.6 also provides a measure of the ef-
ficiency of the legal system, which is an index of restric-
tions and/or complexities of dispute resolutions by courts. 
The importance of accounting measures lies within the 
explanation that they provide transparency in terms of 
management performance.
Governments play a central role in ensuring a speedy, 
predictable and effective enforcement environment for 
securities. In general, the Research Countries are slightly 
different from the UK and the US. For example, Poland 
and Romania have very high corruption standards and 
little effective reporting on the quality of their judicial 
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system or accounting standards. Moreover, low account-
ing standards in some of the other core countries may 
also lead to government action to mitigate the impact of 
inaccurate reporting and any other abuses. An investor 
in Romania or Poland would seem to be poorly protected 
by both the laws and the system that enforces them. The 
opposite can be said for an investor in the US and the UK.
5.5 Capital Markets
5.5.1. Stock Markets
There are several measures of external equity financing 
and stock market development (see La Porta et al. (2006) 
and Djankov et al. (2006)). Table 5.7 summarizes the 
scores of three measures of equity finance: 1) the ratio of 
equity finance to GDP36; 2) the number of domestic firms 
listed on the stock exchange of each country, relative to 
its population; and 3) the value of IPOs of shares as a 
fraction of the economy. 
There is very little IPO activity in the Research Coun-
tries compared to the UK and the US. To be sure, this is 
largely unsurprising because the bank-financing-oriented 
approach of most Research Countries is better suited to 
low-risk investment in capital-intensive companies than 
to supporting higher-risk companies, such as innovative 
start-ups. Indeed, except for the Netherlands, there is a 
very low stock market capitalization to GDP ratio in the 
rest of the Research Countries. Notably, we observed that 
Romania has the highest score of listed firms per million, 
although it has the smallest market capitalization to GDP 
ratio. As expected, all of the Research Countries have a 
much bigger ownership concentration on the stock mar-
ket than either the US or the UK, which is consistent with 
the absence of new listings. 
5.5.2. Alternative Markets
As previously mentioned, the development of an ecosys-
tem is needed to promote the development of an effective 
IPO market in Europe. One solution to bridge the gap in 
equity funding is the emergence of alternative markets. 
Alternative markets are designed to provide the correct 
balance of disclosure and governance standards that 
are convenient for SMEs to register shares for the pur-
pose of going public. To this end, there are a number of 
exchange-regulated markets (including AIM in the UK, 
Alternext in France and the Netherlands, NewConnect 
36 To compute a rough proxy of truly “external” equity finance, we first needed a measure of ownership concentration. We multiplied the total market 
value of common stock of all publicly traded firms by the average fraction of the equity not held by the largest three investors (i.e., the complement of 
the ownership variable just described). We scaled the total market value of common stock by the fraction of equity held by minority shareholders to 
avoid overestimating the availability of external financing. For example, when 90 percent of a firm’s equity is held by insiders, looking at the market 
capitalization of the whole firm gives a tenfold overestimate of how much has actually been raised externally. Therefore, an alternative measure is the 
ratio of “external” (outside of the control group) equity finance to GNP in each country. The results presented below hold for this corrected ratio as 
well. 
37 Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2008). “The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing.” Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol. 88, pp. 430–465; La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleiffer, A. (2006). “What Works in Securities Laws?” The Journal of 
Finance, vol. 61, pp. 1–32.
38 European IPO Task Force, “Rebuilding IPOs in Europe: Creating Jobs and Growth in European Capital Markets”, 
23 March 2015. Link: http://www.evca.eu/media/370031/IPO_Task_Force_Report.pdf 
in Warsaw, Rasdaq in Romania and Deutsche Börse in 
Germany) that could be play a crucial function by helping 
smaller and growing companies raise the capital they 
need for expansion. Generally, these initiatives attempt 
to overcome some of the listing and compliance barriers, 
so that SMEs and other firms can access a new pool of 
investors. Current research suggests that the AIM’s very 
low entry standards has made it possible for the listing of 
younger and foreign firms to access a new network of in-
vestors and an IPO underwriter. On the other hand, while 
the Deutsche Börse has far stricter standards, it recently 
introduced Venture Network, a new online platform that 
matches investors with startups. Given the concern about 
avoiding the excesses of the New Market in the 1990s, 
investors can expect that the new opportunities to make 
direct investments in innovative companies will balance 
their governance concerns with the exploitation of new 
opportunities.
While there is little empirical research on the enabling 
environments of the new exchanges, empirical research 
has examined how disclosure requirements reduce in-
formation asymmetries and remain highly important for 
investors (Djankov et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 2006).37
If we focus on the UK and the US, regulators typically re-
quire extensive disclosures and approval of the transaction 
by shareholders. In contrast, Germany, France and the 
Netherlands typically have fewer disclosure requirements 
and entrust the approval of self-dealing transactions to the 
board (see Table 5.8). 
Listing and being listed are also very costly and include 
various fees and expenses (exchange fees; underwriting 
and non-underwriting costs; annual retainer for sponsors, 
estimated by ECSIP at approx. EUR 50K; brokerage ser-
vices; independent research providers (sometimes); and 
exchange listing fees). Costs are, to a large extent, one of 
the most important determinants of the longer-term trend 
of firms going public on a stock market. In this regard, 
consider the estimates put together by the Federation of 
European Securities Exchanges, which require:38
I.  10% to 15% of the amount raised from an initial 
offering of less than EUR 6 mil;
II.  6% to 10% from less than EUR 50 mil;
III.  5% to 8% from between EUR 50 mil and EUR 
100 mil; and
IV.  3% to 7.5% from more than EUR 100 mil. 
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Table 5.7. Market Outcomes








IPOs to GDP Ownership 
concentration
UK 157,7 0  33,13 11,27 0,19
US 142,14 0,02  22,83 5,47 0,2
France 89,49 0,01  13,73 2,31 0,34
Netherlands 131,74 0,03  12,34 2,63 0,39
Romania 5,46  -  23,33  -  - 
Germany 54,69 0,11  10,55 2,78 0,48
Poland 16,69 0,12 5,71  -  - 
World average 59,39 27,73 2,97 0,11 0,47
Source: Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleiffer, 2008, “The law and economics of 
self-dealing.” Journal of Financial Economics 88 (2008) 430-465
Table 5.8. Disclosure Requirements
Country Disclosure in Prospectus Ex-ante disclosure Ex-post disclosure
UK 0,83 1 1
US 1 0,67 1
France 0,75 0,17 0,8
Germany 0,42 0,28  0,4 
Netherlands 0,5 0,11 0,6
Poland 0 0,5 0,2
Romania 0 0,67 0,6
World average 0,56 0,48 0,67
Source: First Column: La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleiffer, A. (2006), What Works in Securities Laws? The 
Journal of Finance, 61:1 - 32; The second and third column: Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleiffer, 2008, “The law and economics of self-dealing.” Journal of Financial Economics 88 (2008) 430-465
Table 5.9. Tax
Country Statutory Corporate Tax Rate
1st Year Effective 
Tax Rate
5-Year Effective Tax 
Rate
Time to comply with 
taxes (in hours)
UK 30 18,61 21,44 105
US 45,2 18,19 31,99 325
France 35,43 14,06 14,42 128
Germany 37,07 23,5 23,6 105
Netherlands 34,5 25,62 25,62 250
Poland 19 11,54  12,47 175
Romania 25 15,17 15,35 188
Source: The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and Entrepreneurship, by Djankov et al. (2010), American 
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, July 2010.
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5.6 Tax
Can governments create a more desirable tax regime for 
SMEs? What is the impact of taxes on SMEs? The previ-
ous literature shows that the effect of taxes on “mid-size 
domestic” firms is substantial (Djankov et al., 2010). For 
example, SMEs face higher tax-compliance costs relative 
to larger firms. Table 5.9 also shows that the effective 
corporate tax rate has a largely adverse impact on invest-
ments.39 This result supports the view that higher effective 
corporate income taxes lead to a higher level of depend-
ence on debt than on equity finance.
To be sure, there is substantial variation between the 
statutory corporate and the effective tax rates. Consider 
the Research Countries. At the one extreme, Poland has 
the lowest tax rate. At the other extreme sit Germany, the 
Netherlands, France and the UK, which have much higher 
statutory corporate tax rates. Interestingly, compared to 
these countries, France has the lowest effective tax rate. 
Nevertheless, there is little variation across the Research 
Countries between the first-year and fifth-year effective 
tax rates. With respect to the time to comply with taxes, 
the US has the highest score, followed by the Netherlands, 
Germany and the UK, which need the least time com-
pared to all the other countries. 
5.7 Conclusion 
In this section, we surveyed the variation in the legal 
rules and the enabling environment of debt and equity 
in the Research Countries. In this context, we pointed 
out that financing the needs of SMEs requires measures 
that mitigate information asymmetries while increasing 
transparency and disclosure to improve the supply of 
credit. Indeed, despite the new patterns of financing to 
support bank credit, the growth in loans and equity also 
depends on promoting the enforcement and protection 
of fundamental rights. Additionally, phasing in a new 
regulatory framework that supports the listings of SMEs 
and innovative firms is a matter of urgency to help boost 
the investment potential of entrepreneurs and support the 
further growth of the financial market.
39 “The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and Entrepreneurship”, by Djankov et al. (2010), American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, July 
2010.
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Legal Origin Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code of each country. Equals 1 if the origin is English Common Law; 2 if the origin is the French Commercial Code; and 3 if the origin is the German Commercial Code.
La Porta et al. (1998), collected 
from Foreign Law Encyclope-
dia of Commercial Laws of the 
World.
Proxy by mail al-
lowed
Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, and zero 
otherwise. La Porta et al. (1998)
Vote by mail
Equals one if the law explicitly mandates or sets as a default rule that: (a) proxy solicitations paid by the company include 
a proxy form allowingshareholders to vote on the items on the agenda; 
(b) a proxy form to vote on the items on the agendaaccompanies notice to the meeting; or 
(c) shareholders vote by mail on the items on the agenda
 (i.e. postal ballot), and zero otherwise.
Djankov et al. (2006)
Shares not blocked 
Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code does not allow firms to require that shareholders deposit their 
shares prior to a General Shareholders Meeting, thus preventing them from selling those shares for a number of days, 
and zero otherwise.
La Porta et al.(1998)
Shares not deposited
Equals 1 if the law neither requires nor explicitly permits companies to require shareholders to deposit with the company 




Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code allows shareholders to cast all of their votes for one candidate 
standing for election to the board of directors (cumulative voting) or if the Company Law or Commercial Code allows a 
mechanism of proportional representation in the board by which minority interests may name a proportional number of 
directors to the board, and zero otherwise.
La Porta et al. (1998)
Djankov et al. (2006)
Capital to call a 
Meeting
It is the minimum percentage of ownership of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Share-
holders’ Meeting. It ranges from one to 33 percent.
La Porta et al. (1998)
Djankov et. al. (2006)
Preemptive rights Equals one when the Company Law or Commercial Code grants shareholders the first opportunity to buy new issues of stock, and this right can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote, and zero otherwise.
La Porta et al. (1998)
Djankov et al. (2006)
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Variable Description Sources
Oppressed minorities 
Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code grants minority shareholders either a judicial venue to challenge 
the decisions of management or the assembly; or the right to step out of the company by requiring the company to pur-
chase their shares when they object to certain fundamental changes, such as mergers, assets dispositions and changes in 
the articles of incorporation. The variable equals zero otherwise. Minority shareholders are defined as those shareholders 
who own a 10 percent share of capital or less.
La Porta et al. (1998)
Djankov et al. (2006)
Anti directors rights 
index
An index aggregating the shareholder rights which, we label “anti-director rights.” The index is formed by adding 1 when: 
(a) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm; (b) shareholders are not required to deposit their 
shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting; (c) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities 
in the board of directors is allowed; (d) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (e) the minimum percentage 
of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to 10 
percent (the sample median); or (f) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote. 
The index ranges from 0 to 6.




The index of disclosure equals the arithmetic mean of: (a) Prospect; (b) Compensation; (c) Shareholders; (d) Inside own-
ership; (e) Contracts Irregular; and (f) Transactions. La Porta et al. (2006)
Liability standards 
index
The index of liability standards equals the arithmetic mean of: (a) Liability standard for the issuer and its directors; (b) 
Liability standard for distributors; and (c) Liability standard for accountants. La Porta et al. (2006)
Public enforcement 
index
The index of public enforcement equals the arithmetic mean of: (a) Supervisor characteristics index; (b) Rulemaking 
power index; (c) Investigative powers index; (d) Orders index; and (e) Criminal index. La Porta et al. (2006)
Ex-ante private con-
trol of self dealing
Index of ex-ante control of self-dealing transactions. Average of approval bydisinterested shareholders and ex-ante dis-
closure. Djankov et al. (2006)
Ex-post private con-
trol of self dealing
Index of ex-post control over self-dealing transactions. Average of disclosure in periodic filings and ease of proving 
wrongdoing. 
Ranges from zero to one.
Djankov et al. (2006)
Anti self dealing 
index Average of ex-ante and ex-post private control of self-dealing. Djankov et al. (2006)
Public enforcement 
of self dealing
Index of public enforcement. Ranges from 0 to 1. One quarter point when each of the following sanction is available: (a) 
fines for the approving body;
(b) jail sentences for the approving body; (c) fines for Mr. James; and (d) jail sentence for Mr. James.
Djankov et al. (2006)
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Variable Description Sources
Efficiency of judicial 
system
Assessment of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms,” 
produced by the country-risk rating agency Business International Corporation. It “may be taken to represent investors’ 
assessments of conditions in the country in question.” Average between 1980-1983. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores 
indicating lower efficiency levels.
La Porta et al.(1998)
Rule of law
Assessment of the law-and-order tradition in the country produced by the country-risk rating agency International 
Country Risk (ICR). Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale 
from 0 to 10, with lower scores for a weaker law-and-order tradition.(We changed the scale from its original range going 
from 0 to 6).
La Porta et al. (1998)
Corruption
ICR’s assessment of the corruption in government. Lower scores indicate that “high government officials are likely to 
demand special payments” and “illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government” in the 
form of “bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or 
loans.” Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, 
with lower scores for higher levels of corruption. (We changed the scale from its original range going from 0 to 6).
La Porta et al.(1998)
Accounting stand-
ards
Index created by examining and rating companies’ 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 90 items. These 
items fall into seven categories (general information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow statement, account-
ing standards, stock data, and special items). A minimum of three companies in each country were studied. The compa-
nies represent a cross-section of various industry groups in which industrial companies accounted for 70 percent, while 
financial companies represented the remaining 30 percent.
La Porta et al.(1998)
Court formalism to 
collect a bounced 
check
The index measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts 
and is formed by adding up the following indices: (i) professionals vs. laymen; (ii) written vs. oral elements; (iii) legal 
justification; (iv) statutory regulation of evidence; (v) control of superior review; (vi) engagement formalities; and (vii) 
independent procedural actions. The index ranges from 0 to 7, with 7 meaning a higher level of control or intervention 
in the judicial process.
Djankov et al. (2003)
Stock market capital-
ization to GDP
Ratio of the market capitalization (also known as market value, which is the share price times the number of shares out-
standing) of listed domestic companies (the domestically incorporated companies listed on the country’s stock exchanges 
at the end of the year) divided by the GDP (in mil). 
La Porta et al.(1998) for Table II.6 
and World Bank (2005) for figure 
III.1.
Listed firms per mil 
pop.
Ratio of the listed domestic companies, which are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the country’s stock 
exchanges at the end of the year (this indicator does not include investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective 
investment vehicles), to its population (in mil).
La Porta et al. (1998) for Table 
II.6 and World Bank (2005) for 
figure III.2
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Variable Description Sources
IPO’s to GDP Average of the ratio of the equity issued by newly listed firms in a given country (in th) to its gross domestic product (in mil) over the period 1996-2000. La Porta et al. (2006)
Block premium
The block premia are computed by taking the difference between the price per share paid for the control block and the 
exchange price two days after the announcement of the control transaction; dividing by the exchange price; and mul-
tiplying by the ratio of the proportion of cash flow rights represented in the controlling block.” We use the country’s 
sample media.
La Porta et al. (2006), taken from 
Dyck and Zingales (2004)
Ownership concen-
tration
Average percentage of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non-financial, privately 
owned domestic firms in a given country. A firm is consideredprivately owned if the State is not a known shareholder in 
it. 
La Porta et al. (1999) and Hart-
land- Peel (1996) for Kenya; 
Bloomberg and various annual 
reports for Ecuador, Jordan, and 
Uruguay.
Trading volume to 
GDP Total trading volume divided by the country’s GDP (expressed in 2001 USUSD) ‘of a certain country in a given year. World Bank (2005)
Price to book value 
of equity Quotient between the market value of equity and the book value of equity Standard & Poor’s (2005)
External Cap / GNP
The ratio of the stock market capitalization held by minorities to GNP for 1999. The stock market capitalization held by 
minorities is computed as the product of the aggregate stock market capitalization and the average percentage of com-
mon shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non-financial, privately owned domestic firms in a 
given country. A firm is considered privately owned if the State is not a known shareholder in it.
Moody’s International, CIFAR, 
EXTEL, WorldScope, 20-Fs, Price 
Waterhouse and various country 
sources.
Domestic Firms / 
Pop Ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its population (in mil) in 1999. 
Emerging Market Factbook and 
World Development Report 1999.
IPOs / Pop Ratio of the number of initial public offerings of equity in a given country to its population (in mil) for the period 1999. Lopez-de-Silanes (2003)
GDP Growth Average annual percent growth of per capita gross domestic product for the period 1960-1998. World Development Report 2001
Log GNP Logarithm of the Gross National Product in 1999. World Development Report 2001.
